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The Department of Transportation's announced plan to terminate all
federal regulation of airline computer reservation systems (CRS) in 2004
is somewhat surprising in light of modern economic theories of regulation
that highlight barriers to reform. This Article presents evidence on how
CRS regulation affects the market for CRS services from the perspectives
of both traditional and modern theories of regulation. We conclude that
the announcement of a plan to terminate CRS regulations is consistent
with traditional theories of regulation in which the government acts to
maximize social welfare. We also demonstrate that the traditional
approach to evaluating the merits of regulation, as sometimes applied,
exhibits a bias toward rule retention by assuming that the relevant
alternative to regulation is a state of laissez-faire. In fact, the relevant
alternative is typically other forms of intervention by the government, such
as antitrust enforcement, which poses as the government's strategic
alternative for most if not all prior DOT regulation of CRS markets.
Finally, we examine the practical relevance of modern theories of
regulation for explaining the recent move towards deregulation. The
occurrence of entry and technological change prior to CRS deregulation is
of special interest from this perspective. The termination of CRS
regulations is indeed consistent both with the traditional theory of
deregulation in the public interest and with the modern interest group
theory of deregulation in which deregulation is the ultimate conclusion of
a process. Other modern theories of regulation appear not to explain the
timing of reform in this instance.
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Introduction
On December 31, 2003, the Department of Transportation (DOT)
announced plans to terminate its regulations governing the market for the
electronic distribution of tickets and flight information to travel agents.'
This would end, by July 2004, two decades of regulation governing the
airline computer reservation system (CRS) industry. This Article reviews
the economic merits of the DOT's plan of reform and offers an initial
appraisal of how effectively traditional and modem economic theories of
regulation explain the occurrence of deregulation in this instance. It also
identifies a bias toward rule retention that is present in recent applications
of traditional cost-benefit analysis of regulation. This bias occurs when the
government's strategic commitment to intervene is not adequately taken
into account.
CRSs are computer systems that contain and provide information
about airline schedules, availability, fares, and other services.2 Travel
agents can view this information and also make reservations or issue
tickets directly through these systems. When the CRSs first appeared in the
late 1970s, the sudden proliferation of routes and fares after the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 made the conduct of a few CRS vendors appear
critical to the success of an unregulated airline industry, which prompted
the initial interest in CRS regulation. s Twenty years later, the merits of
terminating the CRS regulations might seem obvious in light of the
changes in various market conditions. Nevertheless, the history of CRS
regulation has been a history of delayed sunset, and some skepticism might
naturally arise about whether CRS regulation will actually end in 2004.
The reform of airline CRS regulations is of general interest to
students of the economics of regulation and its reform because regulations
are terminated infrequently. Indeed, the modem literature on regulation
focuses largely on the question of why regulations persist, rather than why
they are terminated. That said, the history of delayed sunset of CRS rules
I For details of the DOT's plan, see Computer Reservation System (CRS) Regulations, 69
Fed. Reg. 976 (Dep't of Transp. Jan. 7, 2004) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 255) [hereinafter 2004
Final Rule]. Subsequently, the DOT released a supplementary document in April of 2004 to assess the
regulatory reform. See Computer Reservations Systems: Regulatory Assessment (Dep't of Transp. Apr.
19, 2004), available at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf89/277889_web.pdf [hereinafter 2004
Regulatory Assessment].
2 For a more detailed description of the workings of CRSs, see infra Section I.A.
3 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. 948 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1991)
("Deregulation fueled demand for computerized fare and flight availability information, and as a result
a substantial percentage of total air passenger bookings were made through CRSs."); Carrier-Owned
Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,644, 11,646 (Civil Aeronautics Bd. proposed Mar.
27, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 NPRM] ("[D]eregulation has allowed carriers to change their flight and
service offerings almost at will, which has created the need for information sources that are updated far
more quickly than those in place prior to 1978 .... [I]t has become more important for air carriers to
have their information displayed on the various computer systems.").
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has given rise to an extensive public record on the merits of CRS reform.
The past evaluations of CRS regulation have mainly followed two
approaches. First, conventional legal articles have approached this
question as a matter of law by critiquing current regulation on the grounds
of jurisdiction 4 and modem antitrust doctrines, such as the monopoly
leveraging theory and the essential facility doctrine.5 But it is unlikely that
any decision to terminate longstanding regulations would be motivated by
the courts; 6 moreover, evaluations of how the federal antitrust courts
would rule on conduct prohibited by any regulation do not fully address
the economic soundness of that regulation
Second, public comments filed with the DOT have approached the
issue as a matter of economics, focusing on the various costs and benefits
of continuing to regulate the CRS industry, including the possibility of
modifying the existing rules versus the alternative of allowing a market
solution without government intervention.' While industry participants
tend to have more information than regulators about the market and its
dynamics, interest group theorists point out the danger of relying on these
4 The DOT's authority to regulate CRSs initially came from Section 411 of the Federal
Aviation Act, which granted the DOT authority to regulate airlines and ticket agents in air
transportation, 49 U.S.C. § 41,712 (2001). In 1985, the Seventh Circuit held that the DOT had
authority to make rules to regulate CRSs. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d
1107, 1112 (7th Cir. 1985) ("It is too late to inquire whether ... rulemaking can be used to prevent
unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition. To hold that it cannot be so used would
pull the rug out from under Congress's restructuring of airline regulation."). Meanwhile, the recent
CRS divestiture by domestic airlines poses a stronger jurisdictional challenge since CRSs are neither
airlines nor ticket agents at this point. Nevertheless, the DOT continues to exercise authority over
CRSs by claiming that CRSs are ticket agents subject to Section 411. See 2004 Final Rule, supra note
1, at 995.
5 See, e.g., Ernest Gellhom & Richard Liebeskind, Flawed DOT Jurisdiction and Antitrust
Rationale, 2003 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 16-17; Bruce H. Rabinovitz & David Heffernan, Regulation
Without Justification?, 2003 AIR & SPACE LAW. 14. In the 2004 Final Rule, the DOT specifically
defined an "unfair method of competition [as] a practice that violates antitrust laws or antitrust
principles" but concedes that this authority is limited. 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 994. To the
extent that the DOT must ensure consistency between the CRS regulations and antitrust law, this
approach appropriately addresses the legal grounds for those regulations. The monopoly leveraging
doctrine holds that a firm may not illegitimately use its monopoly power in one industry to gain an
unfair competitive advantage in another industry. The essential facilities doctrine says that an owner of
an essential facility has an obligation to provide horizontal competitors access to the facility on
reasonable terms. See, e.g., Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulation: Statements of General
Policy, 67 Fed. Reg. 69,366, 69,386 (Dep't of Transp. proposed Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter 2002
NPRM.
6 The Supreme Court has held that absent Congress's clear intent on specific regulations,
government agencies have broad discretion in interpreting statutes and regulating industries. See
Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that absent Congress's clear
intention, the EPA, not the Court, had authority to interpret the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 in
enacting policies).
7 Such evaluations, for example, do not address the value of regulation as a complement to,
or substitute for, enforcement of antitrust laws that will occur independently of the regulations.
8 These comments are available on the U.S. Department of Transportation website by
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sources. 9 It is nevertheless possible to extract information about changes in
market conditions from the record, while weighing separately the
usefulness of that information and its implications for the merits of reform.
Our evaluation of the merits of CRS regulation proceeds in three parts,
drawing upon public documents and building upon the academic literature.
First, we proceed with a traditional economic analysis of regulation,
weighing the social benefits against the social costs of CRS regulations
and using the alternative of no government intervention into the CRS
market as a benchmark. We do not have the data necessary to support a
quantitative analysis of the net benefits of continued CRS regulation. The
record established by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the DOT, however,
identifies the market conditions that proponents of CRS regulation have
found harmful, the nature of the asserted harm, and how specific
regulations have purported to lessen that harm.
The analysis of the social value of continued CRS regulation in this
article is conservative in the sense that we start from the assumption that
proponents' initial beliefs about how CRS regulation could improve
market efficiency were valid. We then ask whether continued CRS
regulation is likely to be beneficial, conditional on those beliefs and in
light of the changes in technology and in market conditions that have
occurred over the past decade. Recognizing that a wealth of information
already exists regarding each specific CRS rule, our discussion of specific
CRS rules will be limited to instances that usefully illustrate the nature of
the constraints that regulators have considered imposing on CRS suppliers
and their owner airlines.'0
Second, we incorporate institutional considerations into the
traditional analysis. In doing so, we update our evaluation to consider the
incentives and abilities of government to intervene, with and without CRS
regulation. We argue that traditional cost-benefit analysis as sometimes
practiced has potentially serious shortcomings. First, evaluations of the
merits of terminating a regulation that address only whether a market
failure continues to exist ignore the potentially adverse unintended effects
of the regulation relative to a market solution. Second, we have found that
analyses underlying public comments on regulatory reform often rely on
the wrong benchmark because they tacitly assume that "no government"
and "free markets" are the most realistic or likely alternative to the rule. In
the case of CRS reform, the relevant alternative to regulation appears not
9 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORMS 109-11 (1982); George
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCi. 3 (1971) (explaining
how interest groups can affect legislators).
10 For a comprehensive discussion of each rule, see 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1. See also
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPLY COMMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (June 9, 2003), available
at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf86/245665_web.pdf [hereinafter DOJ COMMENTS].
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to be a state of laissez-faire but instead antitrust enforcement.
Third, we evaluate the capacity of modern rational choice theories of
regulatory reform to explain the decision to terminate the CRS regulations.
The challenge facing those theories, in this context, is to explain an action
of government that appears to be closely aligned with the public interest.
We consider three modem perspectives, which fall under the general
headings of interest group, institutional, and informational theories of
regulation. We additionally explain how a modem, positive theory of
reform might account for the observed decision to delay termination of
some, but not all, CRS rules.
We conclude that the plan to terminate the CRS regulations passes the
cost-benefit test posed by traditional theories of reform; furthermore,
termination is easily explained by interest-group theories that identify the
dissipation of private gains from regulation as the ultimate cause of
reform. The market conditions that led to concerns about harm from
misconduct in CRS markets have abated over the years. The risk of harm
from misconduct in the absence of regulation thus appears low in current
markets, even by the standards of the regulation's initial proponents. In
addition, advances in Internet-related technology appear to have preceded
the CRS reforms. Suppliers to which the CRS regulations do not apply
have used new technology to enter markets for airline ticket distribution
and related services in competition with the regulated CRS vendors.
Prohibitive costs plausibly deterred the government from imposing the
CRS regulations on the new entrants, so a plan was adopted to terminate
the regulations.
Freed of regulatory constraints, the traditional CRS vendors are likely
to face lower costs of competing with alternative suppliers of electronic
ticket distribution services. They can take advantage of scale and scope
economies that might have been less accessible under regulation, subject
to constraints associated with the threat of antitrust enforcement by the
government or through private actions. This sequence of events typifies
the modem interest group theory view of deregulation as the culmination
of a process.
We also find that insights from institutional and informational
theories of regulation add richness to our understanding of reform,
although they do not suggest alternative explanations for the timing of
reform in this instance. Institutional barriers to CRS reform have been low
for more than a decade. CRS markets and regulations are obscure to the
general public, a condition that would suggest, under modem
informational asymmetry theories of regulation, that CRS regulations
would be continued. We discuss the potentially countervailing roles of two
institutions in CRS reform: the notice-and-comment procedures
established by the Administrative Procedure Act for informal rulemakings
Vol. 21:369, 2004
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and the statutory grant of antitrust jurisdiction over the airline industry to
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).
The conclusion that antitrust enforcement is the relevant alternative to
CRS regulation in this instance may seem quite natural, yet it has been
overlooked in much of the public discourse over the merits of CRS reform
and, we suspect, over the merits of regulation generally. The harms that
CRS regulations sought to eliminate are typically the harms that antitrust
statutes are specifically designed to address. Private parties, accordingly,
have rights of action against such misconduct. Moreover, the federal
government has established a commitment to taking antitrust action in
response to concerns about its occurrence.
This commitment is strategic in the sense that deregulation would
likely trigger increased antitrust scrutiny of CRS markets in the near term,
even without any express reassignment of authority within the federal
government or express direction of Congress. While the DOJ's 2003
comments on CRS regulation highlight the likelihood of antitrust action
against misconduct after rule termination, our review of the public record
leading to the decision to terminate the CRS rules suggests that past
analyses of rule termination have tended to assume that a total lack of
government intervention-free markets-is the relevant alternative to
regulation. The erroneous use of free markets as a benchmark for
comparison can introduce a significant bias in favor of regulation into
analyses of the merits of reform.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I reviews the history of the
CRS industry and its regulation. Part II explains how proponents expected
the initial CRS regulations to benefit the public from an economic
perspective and identifies the market conditions that initially supported
regulation of the industry. In Part III, we explain how market conditions
have since evolved and present the implication that continued CRS
regulation provides little or no benefit to the public, even from the
perspective of a proponent of the initial rules. In Part IV, we identify
antitrust intervention as the relevant benchmark against which to evaluate
CRS regulation and identify a form of bias that inadvertently enters some
traditional analysis. Finally, in Part V, we review alternative, positive
theories of regulatory reform and examine how well they account for the
government's recent decision to terminate its regulation of airline CRS
markets.
I. History of the Industry and the Regulation
The first CRS rules were issued in 1984, six years after the Airline
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Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978.' In keeping with the Civil Aeronautics
Board's (CAB) statutory authority, the overarching goal was to safeguard
competition in the airline industry against possible abuses. Although the
emergence of new airline regulations such a short time after the ADA
might look suspiciously like a move to reinstate the old airline regulations,
the impetus for CRS rules was at least nominally distinct from that of the
terminated airline regulations.
In 1984, CRSs were a relatively new technology. The use of CRS
technology by newly deregulated airlines can be seen as a first sign of
beneficial innovation due to the decision to deregulate the industry.
Alternatively, it could be seen as a harmful threat to the social gains
anticipated from deregulation. The initial proponents of CRS regulation
took the latter view, and their assumptions about the nature of the harms
that the regulations could prevent were ultimately established as a
foundation for two decades of commentary about the optimal design of
CRS rules, 12 including the past year's evaluation of the merits of CRS rule
termination. Since we are interested in the merits of continued CRS
regulation, even under the conservative assumption that initial beliefs
about the value of CRS regulations were valid, the history of the industry
that we present in this section will tend to highlight the facts and expressed
concerns about CRS markets that led to the promulgation of CRS rules and
that served as the foundation for two decades of regulation. This allows us
to show in Part III why a conclusion that CRS regulations do not today
pass a cost-benefit test can be consistent not only with initial opposition to
the regulations, but also with the proponents' view that CRS regulations
were initially in the public interest.
It is realistic to view the first CRS rules as the government's response
to specific complaints about the conduct of CRS vendors, which were at
the time operating as business units of major airlines. Those complaints,
which we discuss in this Part, were the subject of lengthy investigations by
the CAB and the DOJ before the issuance of the first rule. From a
proponent's perspective, CRS regulation can thus be seen, first, as an
attempt to remedy misconduct that had been the subject of specific
complaints and, second, as part of a larger strategy to shape the effect of
the new CRS technology on the structures of newly-deregulated markets
for passenger air travel and CRS services, as we explain in this Part.
11 For a more detailed history of CRS regulation, see 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 979-
85.
12 See, e.g., STEVEN A. MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY 63 (1995) ("[T]he problem of bias has emerged since 1978 and is believed by some
to erode the benefits from [airline] deregulation.").
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A. Early Airline CRSs: Innovation and Complaints
Before the 1970s, airlines distributed information about their flights
in a hard-copy publication known as the Official Airline Guide (OAG).
The OAG contained carrier schedules and fare information. A travel agent,
after collecting information about his or her customer's travel preferences,
would look in the OAG to find a suitable flight. After checking rules and
restrictions for each flight, the agent would call the air carrier by telephone
to confirm the price and availability of the flight, book a ticket for the
consumer, and handwrite the airline ticket. This is the method of
identifying and booking flights that the CRS technology eventually
replaced. In fact, the first commercial CRS systems were descendants of
airlines' internal scheduling and booking operations.
The information systems that U.S. regulators have termed, "airline
computer reservation systems," or "CRSs," essentially consist of an
electronic database that contains airline flight and ticket information,
which travel agents can access through a network of local computer
terminals and printers. These systems are also known as "global
distribution systems," or "GDSs." From a supply-side perspective, the
CRS vendors' essential role is to maintain a database from which it
disseminates flight and fare information to be posted, or "displayed," on
subscribing travel agents' computer terminals. Today, CRSs serve three
primary functions in airline ticketing: CRSs (i) manage flight inventory
and display; (ii) help travel agents search for fares; and (iii) generate
tickets and other related documents for air travel. Figure 1 is a
diagrammatic representation of how information and payments have
traditionally been transmitted and received by travel agents, consumers,
airlines, and CRSs.
13
While some Internet ticketing services, such as Orbitz, today allow
consumers to bypass travel agents, a CRS is, virtually by definition, an
intermediary between travel agents and airlines. Consumers of air travel
would not normally use CRSs directly except through travel agents.
Virtually all domestic travel agents today are connected to at least one
CRS vendor.14 CRS technology has evolved a great deal since the 1970s.
Its scope has expanded from being a simple reservoir of airline fare
information to providing information on reserving hotels, cruises, and
13 This diagram does not include the alternative channels now provided by the Internet. We
will later show how information and payment flow structures have changed in light of this new
technology. See infra Section III.C.
14 Even with the advent of the Internet services, CRSs still account for a majority of airline
ticket sales. For example, "[in 1999 travel agencies sold almost three-quarters of all airline tickets....
One survey reported that travel agencies made 93 percent of their domestic airline bookings and 81
percent of their international airline bookings through a system in 1999." 2002 NPRM, supra note 5, at
69,369-70.
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rental cars. Later, we discuss how CRSs have developed in tandem with
the advent of online travel agencies. It appears that if the incumbent CRSs
can keep up with evolving technology, develop more products, and
accommodate different forms of agencies, they will continue to compete
profitably in markets for the electronic distribution of travel information
and bookings.




Feeen S netvI I  Fee IMo° W
Bdnck & Mortar Brick & Mortar




American Airlines and United Airlines were the first to make CRS
technology commercially available. Before they introduced their systems,
respectively Sabre15 and Apollo, there were numerous failed attempts at
developing a commercially viable CRS. 16 Automatic Travel Agency
Reservations System (ATARS) made a first attempt in the 1960s to
provide a CRS that was to be jointly owned and operated by a consortium
of twenty-one airlines. This project failed mainly because the CAB refused
to grant antitrust immunity.' 7 Prior to launching its own CRS, American
Airlines also tried to persuade other major airlines to collaborate on
creating a jointly owned CRS. Although American obtained government
15 See R. Preston McAfee & Kenneth Hendricks, Evolution of the Market for Air-Travel
Information 8 (2003), in SABRE INC., COMMENTS OF SABRE INC. (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf85/237425 web.pdf. "Sabre" stands for the Semi-Automated
Business Research Environment. Sabre has actually existed as an internal computer system within
American Airlines since 1964. The multi-airline CRS concept, however, came about much later.
16 OFFICE OF ECON., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., STUDY OF AIRLINE COMPUTER RESERVATION
SYsTEMs 8 n.2 (1988) (describing the various CRS projects that failed prior to Sabre and Apollo).
17 See Jerome Ellig, Computer Reservation Systems, Creative Destruction, and Consumer
Welfare: Some Unsettled Issues, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 287, 293 (1991).
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approval in 1974, this project was abandoned due to insufficient funding. 18
Soon after the collapse of the joint-CRS project, United Airlines decided to
create its Apollo system, and American responded by marketing Sabre.
These CRSs were used to provide information to travel agents about many
different airlines, not just American and United.
Not long after these CRSs began operating, a number of small airlines
filed complaints and antitrust lawsuits against American and United. In
1982, Braniff Airlines, on the brink of filing for Chapter 11 protection,
accused American Airlines of "dirty tricks" by using its CRS "to cancel
Braniff reservations and switch passengers to American's competing
flights." 19 Other airlines soon followed Braniff's lead. In 1983, Frontier
Airlines "alleged that United refused for two years to allow Frontier to
become a cohost in United's Apollo computer system, and thus effectively
kept Frontier schedules off the computer screens." 20 Continental Airlines
claimed that "as much as $55 million per day in airline ticket payments
that should [have been] going directly to other airlines [was] being
diverted instead to American and United for as long as 53 days.'
Republic Airlines also complained about the influence of CRS-owning
airlines on the manner in which CRSs were presenting their flight
information to travel agents.22 Although American and United denied most
of these allegations, they argued that they should receive certain benefits
from the ownership of their systems after having invested $160 million
and $250 million, respectively, in developing them.23 In rejecting the
complaints of competing airlines, American Airlines' then-president
Robert L. Crandall observed that "[h]aving successfully developed and
marketed our system, we now find ourselves subject to criticism by
carriers that did not choose to make similar investments."
24
The CAB began looking into these allegations in 1982, and concluded
that practices which became known as "display bias" and "functionality
bias" were problematic. "Display bias" refers to the practice of placing the
owner airline's flights at the top of the information displays that CRSs
transmit to travel agents. "Functionality bias" refers to features of CRS
system design or operation that indirectly have the same effect on the
18 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1991).
19 Carole Shifrin, American Airlines Denies Braniff's Charges, WASH. POST, May 18, 1982,
at D6; see BraniffRekindles Feud with American as Creditors Start Reorganization Work, WALL ST. J.,
May 18, 1982, at4.
20 Douglas B. Feaver, Justice Steps Up Probe of Airline Ticketing Systems, WASH. POST,
Mar. 13, 1983, atF1.
21 Id.
22 See id.
23 Dean Rotbart, CAB Seen Laying Groundwork for Rules on Computer Airline Reservation
Systems, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1983, at 2.
24 Douglas B. Feaver, Flight Booking Controversy Lands on Hill, WASH. POST, June 26,
1983, at GI.
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display as display bias. For example, a CRS might be designed to update
the information on the owner airline more frequently than on other airlines.
The concern was that such biases could discourage travelers from booking
flights on non-owner airlines and thereby undermine competition between
airlines.25 The possibility of price discrimination by CRS-owning airlines
in setting booking fees raised similar concerns about how airline
ownership of CRSs would affect markets for passenger air travel.
A CRS-owning airline also could take steps to affect competition
between CRSs. For example, a CRS-owning airline could attempt to
exclude competing CRSs from the market by refusing to pay special
"override" commissions 26 to local travel agencies that did not use its
system. Alternatively, it could refuse to provide flight information to,
purchase services from, or otherwise "participate in" competing CRSs,
which could make those competing CRSs less attractive to travel agents.27
Relatedly, CRS vendors might add terms to the travel agent subscription
contracts to make it more costly for travel agents to switch systems, even
without airline CRS ownership.28 The CAB expressed concern about how
incumbent CRS vendors could engage in conduct to foreclose entry by
new CRS suppliers, and these concerns formed the CAB's basis for
promulgating the rules in 1984. The alternative interpretation of CRSs as
a socially beneficial innovation remains, however. For instance, the
practice that became known as display bias can actually be beneficial in
some settings. We return to these issues more generally in Parts II and III.
By August of 1982, CAB members voted to issue an advanced notice
of proposed rulemaking. CAB Chairman Dan McKinnon said that the
CRSs were "the single most significant factor affecting competition in the
airline industry today."
29
25 See 1984 NPRM, supra note 3, at 11,647 ("Some CRS vendors have sufficient economic
power to require... that their competitors compensate them for writing some kinds of tickets.").
26 An override commission is an additional commission paid to travel agents as a bonus for
productivity and/or volume.
27 See 1984 NPRM, supra note 3, at 11,647 ("CRS carrier vendors are apparently gaining
the ability to determine the terms on which they provide automated information distribution services
on the basis of the extent to which the other carriers compete with them.").
28 See Computer Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,780, 43,800
(Dep't of Transp. Sept 22, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 CRS Rules] ("While a system owner will lose
bookings from subscribers in another system when it reduces the level of its participation in that
system, the loss in airline bookings can be outweighed by the gain in CRS subscriptions (and the likely
increase in its airline revenues from the new subscribers).").
29 Douglas B. Feaver, CAB To Seek Fair Computer Ticket System, WASH. POST, Aug. 11,
1983, at D12.
Vol. 21:369, 2004
Economics of Regulatory Reform
B. Jurisdictional Muddle Among CAB, DOT, DOJ, and FTC&
As a CRS market began to emerge prior to 1979, airlines initially
enjoyed antitrust immunity. The Federal Aviation Act3' delegated to the
CAB the authority to regulate mergers, consolidations, and controls in this
industry.32 Most of this immunity was lost over the next decade. By 1989,
the DOT had emerged as the primary successor to the CAB within the
federal government. The Antitrust Division of the DOJ completed its
acquisition of antitrust enforcement authority in airline-related markets in
that year.
The late completion of this transfer of antitrust authority does not
mean that the DOJ played no role in the early evolution of the CRS
industry. Just as the CAB began conducting an investigation into the CRS
industry in 1982, the DOJ impaneled a grand jury to determine whether
American had engaged in anticompetitive conduct and "attempted ... to
monopolize service at Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport." 3 This and
other investigations of CRS and related markets led the DOJ to conclude
that "the [CRSs'] exercise of 'market power [was inhibiting] the ability' of
other airlines to compete on routes dominated by the airline whose
reservation system is used. 34 The DOJ found, for instance, that at one
point, "American decided not to match Continental's 'supersaver' fares in
30 For more details on the government's oversight of the airline industry, see Donald T.
Bliss & Jacob M. Lewis, Overseeing Competition in the Airline Industry: Will the Transfer to Justice
Make a Difference?, 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 293 (1987); and Joan M. Feldman, US. Airline
Concentration Burden Shifts to Justice Department, AIR TRANSP. WORLD, Feb. 1, 1989, at 34,
available at 1989 WL 2561547.
31 The CAB initially was given the power to approve, among other things, air carrier
mergers and consolidations. Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 408, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (2001); § 409, 49
U.S.C. § 1379 (interlocking relationships); § 412, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (inter-carrier agreements). The
DOT assumed these powers in 1984. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92
Stat. 1705.
32 The phase-out of the domestic airlines' antitrust immunity appears to have been gradual.
CAB's authority to grant immunity in the domestic airline industry was substantially curtailed as a
result of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The record shows that even prior to 1989, the DOJ
could have brought antitrust action against domestic airlines, but chose not to. See Feldman, supra note
30 ("Prior to the CAB rules, Justice could have sued the two biggest vendors but did not. Justice could
have pursued divestiture by United and American, but [it did not]."). Although there was a brief period
of time prior to 1984 when the DOJ was given antitrust oversight of the airline industry, this oversight
duty was also shifted to the DOT when the CAB was dissolved. See TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH
BOARD, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WINDS OF CHANGE: DOMESTIc AIR TRANSPORT SINCE
DEREGULATION 30 (1981). In any case, before 1989, DOT retained authority to review mergers and
consolidations in the industry, and DOJ might have been reluctant to bring cases while its antitrust
oversight was limited. Hence, 1989 seems to be the practically relevant turning point of the jurisdiction.
33 Shifrin, supra note 19, at D6.
34 Justice Dept. Says Airlines Ran Biased Reservation System, Dow JONES NEWS SERV.,
Nov. 17, 1983. The Justice Department investigation also showed "that more than half of all ticket
sales on [American Airlines'] computer system were for flights listed first. And more than 90% were
for flights listed on the first of several computer screens displaying possibilities." Christopher Conte,
Charging Bias Airlines Ask CAB To Change Reservation Systems, WALL ST. J, Feb. 9, 1984, at 29.
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65 markets, but simply to remove [them] from the Sabre fare display."35 It
also posited evidence that United "suppressed information in its Apollo
system on specific Frontier, USAir, and, perhaps, Continental flights.
36
Over the years, the DOJ has repeatedly gone on the record in support of
CRS regulation.
37
To be sure, the DOJ's support for CRS regulation has had some
limits. An example is the DOJ's response to airline proposals to regulate
the "booking fees" that airlines pay CRS vendors for travel agents booking
tickets through CRS systems, over and above any commission that the
airline may pay directly to the travel agent. These proposals sought to
address an increase in booking fees that airlines attributed to the
"mandatory participation" regulations. Those regulations limited airlines'
bargaining power over fees by requiring that each CRS-owning airline
participate in every CRS, so long as the CRS offered "commercially
reasonable terms."' The DOJ has generally opposed such proposals to
institute price or fee regulations that it has regarded as harmfully distorting
markets.
39
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 provided that the CAB would
sunset at the end of 1984, and the DOT subsequently assumed federal
responsibility for overseeing the airline industry.40 The DOT's authority to
review airline mergers fully expired on January 1, 1989, and the transfer of
authority over enforcement of the antitrust laws as they apply to the airline
industry from the DOT to the DOJ was complete. Since then, the DOT has
continued its CRS regulation while the DOJ has maintained authority to go
to court against any airline or CRS vendor that might violate the antitrust
laws. The Antitrust Division's primary sources of remedy are consent
decrees and other civil, court-enforced judgments. It can proceed
criminally in some instances. The DOJ also retains the authority to file
comments on DOT-enforced regulations and could even request that the
DOT issue and enforce new rules. The DOJ has demonstrated its
enforcement authority in the airline industry by investigating and indeed
challenging a number of airline mergers and related conduct.41
Consequences of the initial allocation of authority appear to linger,
35 Douglas B. Feaver, U.S. Sees Need To Correct Air Ticket Systems, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
1983, at D8.
36 Id.
37 See Douglas B. Feaver, CAB Votes To Change Agent Lists; Plan Would Force Systems
To Offer Competing Flights, WASH. POST, July 13, 1984, at DI.
38 See 14 C.F.R. § 255.7 (1993) (adopted by 1992 CRS Rules, supra note 28).
39 Albert R. Karr & Robert E. Taylor, American Air, United Accused on Reservations,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1983, at 38.
40 See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1704
(codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. app.).
41 Scott McCartney & Bill Adair, Hubb-Bub: Merger Talk Fills Skies and Airline
Regulators Have A Juggling Act, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2000, at Al.
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however. During most of the 1980s, "[the DOJ was] only a party to
important decisions concerning airline competition, not the government's
principal policymaker in the field. It has been more an advisor than an
influence." 42 Even after the transfer of authority, the DOJ did not
necessarily gain a full mandate to oversee competition. Because Congress
gave the DOT transitional authority over airline competition law, the DOJ,
in essence, "was not in charge at a crucial time" and "lost the chance to
make a real policy impact.
' 43
Meanwhile, the DOT derives much of its authority from what is
currently Section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act, which is modeled after
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The DOT has frequently
stated-and the Seventh Circuit has affirmed-that its authority is greater
than simple antitrust enforcement.4 It also cites authority to write and
enforce consumer protection rules. 45 Generally, federal authority over
consumer protection enforcement resides in the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC).
Despite its general expertise, however, the FTC's authority over
enforcement in the airline industry has not grown in proportion to the
DOJ's antitrust authority over airlines. The FTC initially had some
authority over the airline industry, but it was denied airline consumer
protection authority in 1984 and has since continued to lack a basis for
acting. 46 The FTC has thus taken more of a bystander role in CRS
regulation than has the DOJ.47 Although the FTC lacks formal jurisdiction
over airlines, 48 what remains unclear is the extent to which evolving case
law on Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act will affect the
DOT's parallel interpretation of Section 411.49
Overlapping jurisdictional boundaries are important for the analysis
of the merits of CRS regulation. Uncertainty about who is in charge can
42 Feldman, supra note 30, at 34.
43 Id.
44 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 994 ("Section 411 allows us to prohibit some conduct
that is not prohibited by the antitrust laws."); see also United Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
766 F.2d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 1985).
45 See 2002 NPRM, supra note 5, at 69,384.
46 Id.
47 The latest comments filed by the FTC in response to the 2002 NPRM raised serious
concerns about the DOT's authority to issue and maintain its proposed CRS regulations and cited
possible errors in the DOT's interpretation of the case law, yet the FTC ultimately deferred to the DOT
with the statement that "the interpretation of the [DOT's] legal authority is not within FTC's purview."
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, COMMENTS (June 6, 2003), available at http://dmses.dot.gov/
docimages/pdf86/245557_web.pdf [hereinafter FTC COMMENTS].
48 While the FTC lacks jurisdiction over airlines, the CRSs have now been divested, and,
interestingly enough, the FTC does have parallel jurisdiction over travel agents. Given that the DOT's
authority to regulate CRSs derives at least in part from the view that CRSs are travel agents, it is
possible that the FTC may have at least concurrent jurisdiction over CRSs. See 2004 Final Rule, supra
note 1, at 995.
49 See infra Section III.E.
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cause coordination failures in which each agency devotes excessive
resources to monitoring an industry's activities or, alternatively,
expenditure of inadequate resources if each agency erroneously assumes
the other is doing the monitoring. Successful coordination also can take
different forms. One agency can defer to the other completely, or the two
agencies can choose to assume complementary roles, with one writing
rules and the other commenting on them. The latter case appeared to arise
between the DOT and DOJ during the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the
DOT initiating regulatory actions and DOJ responding to the DOT's
solicitations for public comments. Similarly, the DOT's analysis of its
December 2003 final rule closely follows the DOJ's expressed
recommendations.50
It is also important to recognize that even if the planned deregulation
is pursued accordingly, federal regulation in the airline industry is not
necessarily over. Deregulation does not indicate termination of jurisdiction,
but simply of the particular rules that were in force. So long as the DOT
continues to maintain authority to regulate the air travel service industry,
the DOT has the right to intervene in the future, if necessary, by means of
re-regulation.
C. Efforts To Obtain Antitrust Remedies
Initial concerns about CRS misconduct led not only to calls for
regulation but also to requests for damages and relief from the courts. The
DOJ did not initiate action against CRSs, however. Instead, private parties
independently sought relief under the antitrust statutes. In 1988, several
antitrust cases were combined in the In re Air Passenger Computer
Reservations Systems Antitrust Litigation.51 Continental and ten other
airlines brought suit against United and American, alleging antitrust
violations and attempts to monopolize markets for air transportation and
CRS services. The court generally rejected the application of the essential
facility doctrine and the monopoly leveraging theory to CRSs, but it also
decided that there was evidence-including a recorded phone
conversation-of specific intent to monopolize an airline hub and of
anticompetitive conduct. The remainder of this case was pursued in Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc. The Ninth Circuit granted thedefendants' motion for summary judgment and concluded that "[American
50 See generally 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1 (extensively citing the DOJ COMMENTS,
supra note 10).
51 In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D.
Cal. 1988).
52 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 977 (1992).
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and United's] control of their CRSs did not give them power to eliminate
competition in the downstream air transportation market."53 Subsequently,
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, finally ending this
seven-year saga of antitrust litigation in the CRS industry.
Separate antitrust suits were also filed against American and United.
In the In re "Apollo" Air Passenger Computer Reservation System54 case,
a competing CRS vendor, SystemOne Direct Access, Inc., accused United
of monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the provision of CRS
services to travel agencies, or engaging in exclusionary practices by
subjecting travel agencies to subscriber agreements that violated the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. SystemOne was then owned by Texas Air
Group, which was the parent of Eastern Airlines and Continental Airlines.
The court, in granting United's motion for summary judgment, held that
SystemOne had failed to show that United had engaged in monopolization
or drafted subscriber contracts that imposed unreasonable restraints on
competition in violation of Sherman Act. The court saw no evidence of
predatory conduct in United's liquidated damages, minimum use, and
rollover clauses; and it ruled that United, despite its significant market
share, did not exhibit anticompetitive behavior in acquiring or maintaining
its market position. The court's opinion also declared that the CRS market
was competitive as of 1989."
It is important to remember that these antitrust cases occurred in the
industry while it was still heavily regulated. By 1989, the CRS rules had
been in place for five years and CRSs had been complying with them. The
record shows, for instance, that United revised its contracts with travel
agents specifically to comply with the CAB's rules.56 It is possible that the
courts chose not to intervene because the federal government then
regulated CRS markets through the DOT; and federal regulation can
confer an implied immunity from antitrust law. 57 If this explains the
various court holdings, one might wonder why a plaintiff would ever incur
the cost of bringing an antitrust suit against a regulated CRS supplier. A
plausible answer is that the value of the treble damages that a plaintiff
would expect to receive under antitrust law was enough to offset the lower
probability of success inherent in bringing an antitrust action against
53 Id. at 545.
54 In re "Apollo" Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys., 720 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
55 See id. at 1079.
56 See id at 1074.
57 In general, even when "regulatory statutes say nothing at all about the impact of the
regulatory regime on antitrust jurisdiction," some amount of "limitation on or exemption from
antitrust" may be implied. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 703 (1999); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in
Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. L. 607, 628 (2003) (describing an instance in which SEC regulation
was used as a basis for obtaining immunity against antitrust enforcement action in federal courts).
385
Yale Journal on Regulation
regulated suppliers of CRS services.
D. Evolution of the CRS Rules: 1984 to Present
In March 1984, against this backdrop of complaints and public
requests for regulatory intervention, the CAB proposed the first CRS rules,
the most prominent features of which were prohibitions against display
and functionality bias and against charging "discriminatory" booking fees.
Some industry observers have suggested that the CAB should have instead
ordered the airlines to divest their CRS ownership. This course of action
would have addressed the complaints, but at a potentially high cost. By
ordering divestiture, the CAB could have caused potentially significant
increases in the costs of producing CRS services because of the possibility
that CRS efficiency depended on economies of scale and scope that would
continue to accrue only if the CRSs remained vertically and operationally
integrated with the owner airlines. Nevertheless, the argument remained
that the initial regulations did not go far enough. Among the critics,
Republic Airlines advocated complete divestiture and criticized the CAB
for proposing rules that "only treat 'symptoms,' rather than 'attacking the
structural problems."' 58 Other airlines that were critical of the regulations
considered collaborating on an independent CRS of their own. 9
CRS regulation in its current form is an end product of a number of
revisions. Promulgated in 1984, the first CRS rules specified self-
termination on December 31, 1990. The 1984 CRS rules:
" Prohibited display and functionality bias across airlines;
60
* Required nondiscriminatory booking fees to participating
airlines;
61
* Prohibited any CRS-owning airline from tying travel agent
commissions to CRS use;
62
* Governed the terms of contracts between CRSs and travel
agents, such as the length of contracts, minimum uses, and
prohibition of rollover clauses ;63
58 Steve Willey, Critics See Gaps in Rules Proposed on Use of Airline Computer
Reservation Systems, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1984, at 10.
59 Airlines Proposed Creating 'Neutral' Booking System, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1985, at 8;
see also Carol Jouzaitis, Group Bids for TWA's Ticket Net, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 16, 1985, at C3. This
system, called the NIBS, never went beyond the discussion phase.
60 Airline Computer Reservation Systems: Display of Information, 14 C.F.R. § 255.4 (1992)
(adopted by 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (Civil Aeronautics Bd. Aug. 15, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 CRS Rules])
(readopted by 1992 CRS Rules, supra note 28).
61 Contracts with Participating Carriers, 14 C.F.R. § 255.5(a) (1984) (adopted by 1984 CRS
Rules, supra note 61) (readopted as 14 C.F.R. § 255.6(a) (1992), by 1992 CRS Rules, supra note 28).
62 Id. at § 255.5(b)-(c) (1984) (adopted by 1984 CRS Rules, supra note 61) (readopted as 14
C.F.R. § 255.6(b)-(c) (1992), by 1992 CRS Rules, supra note 28).
63 Carrier-Owned Computerized Reservation Systems: Contracts with Subscribers, 14
C.F.R. § 255.6 (1984) (adopted by 1984 CRS Rules, supra note 61) (readopted as 14 C.F.R. § 255.8
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* Required CRSs to provide equal service enhancements and
updates to all participating carriers (excluding the system
owner);64 and
* Required CRSs to provide marketing information upon
request to participating carriers.65
In 1992, the DOT-which had gained authority over economic
regulation of the airline industry from the CAB-ended an extensive study
of the industry with the conclusion that "CRS rules remain[ed] essential,
66
due to CRSs' persisting market power. In addition to re-adopting all of the
1984 rules, the 1992 CRS rules added new requirements and prohibitions
that, again, applied only to airline-owned CRSs. The new rules:
* Required CRSs to provide equal service enhancements to all
participating carriers including the system owner (effectively
forcing the system owner to share the latest developed tools
with all other airlines);
67
" Required airlines that owned CRSs to participate in all
competing CRSs at the same level under "commercially
reasonable terms" (the "mandatory participation" rule);
68
* Prohibited airlines that owned CRSs from requiring that
travel agents make a specified minimum number of bookings
on their equipment;
69
* Prohibited CRSs from imposing restrictions on travel agents'
use of third-party hardware, software and databases; 70 and
* Required CRSs to provide to carriers upon request current
information on the CRS's fee levels and fee arrangements
with other participating carriers.71
Five years later, the DOT amended its 1992 rules to prohibit CRS
vendors from including "parity" clauses in their contracts with airlines.
These clauses required the signatory airline to purchase at least the same
(1992), by 1992 CRS Rules, supra note 28).
64 Carrier-Owned CRSs: Service Enhancement, 14 C.F.R. § 255.7 (1984) (adopted by 1984
CRS Rules, supra note 61) (readopted as 14 C.F.R. § 255.5 (1992), by 1992 CRS Rules, supra note
28).
65 Marketing Information, 14 C.F.R. § 255.8 (1984) (adopted by 1984 CRS Rules, supra
note 61) (readopted as 14 C.F.R. § 255.10 (1992), by 1992 CRS Rules, supra note 28).
66 1992 CRS Rules, supra note 28, at 43,780.
67 Defaults and Service Enhancements, 14 C.F.R. § 255.5 (1992) (adopted by 1992 CRS
Rules, supra note 28).
68 System Owner Participation in Other Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 255.7 (1992) (adopted by
1992 CRS Rules, supra note 28).
69 Contracts with Subscribers, 14 C.F.R. § 255.8(b) (1992) (adopted by 1992 CRS Rules,
supra note 28).
70 Use of Third Party Hardware, Software, and Databases, 14 C.F.R. § 255.9 (1992)
(adopted by 1992 CRS Rules, supra note 28).
71 Contracts with Participating Carriers, 14 C.F.R. § 255.6(d) (1992) (adopted by 1992 CRS
Rules, supra note 28).
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level of service from the signatory CRS vendor as from any other CRS
72vendor. Without an enforceable parity clause, an airline might pay the
signatory CRS vendor only for the service of providing agents with its
flight and ticket information, for example, while it paid other CRS vendors
a premium for also allowing travel agents to issue tickets and make seat
assignments on its flights. Parity clauses are a type of most favored nation
(MFN) clause, through which the signatory buyer (or seller) is obligated to
treat the signatory seller (buyer) at least as well certain other sellers (or
buyers).73 In addition to adopting the parity rule, the DOT modified the
prohibition against display bias so as to require each system (i) to offer at
least one integrated display that uses the same criteria for both online and
interline connections and (ii) to use elapsed time or non-stop itinerary as a
significant factor in selecting the flight options from the database.74
Since 1997, the sunset of the CRS regulations was delayed annually
until December 2003. The latest extensive review of the appropriateness of
CRS regulation occurred in 2002-03 and culminated with the DOT's
announcement on December 31, 2003 that all but two of the CRS rules
would expire at the scheduled sunset date of January 31, 2004. It
specifically delayed termination of prohibitions against display bias and
the use of parity clauses, which are to remain for a scheduled six-month
"transition period" and end on July 31, 2004.75 On this date, the DOT is
scheduled to have completely terminated all command-and-control
regulations of the CRS industry. The plan is thus to terminate the last rule
exactly twenty years after the CAB issued the first CRS rule. Table 1
summarizes the development of CRS rules since their inception in 1984.
72 The 1997 rules prohibit each CRS from "requir[ing] a carrier (other than a carrier that
owns or markets [a CRS]) to maintain any particular level of participation or buy any enhancements in
its system on the basis of participation levels or enhancements selected by that carrier in any other
[CRS]." Contracts with Participating Carriers, 14 C.F.R. § 255.6(e) (1998) (adopted by 62 Fed. Reg.
59,784 (Dep't of Transp. Nov. 5, 1997)).
73 The phrase "most favored nation clause" originates from international trade agreements
whereby the signatory nations are bound to extend trading benefits equal to those accorded to any third
state. See International Trade Data Systems, Normal Trade Relations, at
http://www.itds.treas.gov/mfn.html (last modified Apr. 23, 2004) (explaining the history behind the
MFN clause dating back to 1948 and how its name has recently been changed to "Normal Trade
Relation.").
74 Display of Information, 14 C.F.R. § 255.4(a) (1998) (adopted by 62 Fed. Reg. 63,837)
(Dep't of Transp. Dec. 3, 1997)).
75 See 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1. The DOT eliminated all of the CRS rules, but
readopted rules governing display bias, 14 C.F.R. § 255.4 (2004), and parity clauses, 14 C.F.R. § 255.5
(2004). It also added a transitory prohibition against CRS's refusals to deal with airlines that do not
provide best fares. See infra Table 1.
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Table 1. Development of CRS Rules
1984 Prohibit display and functionality bias
(CAB) Prohibit discriminatory booking fees
Prohibit travel agent commissions to CRS use
Govern contract lengths, prohibit minimum uses and rollover
clauses
Require equal service enhancements and updates (excluding the
system owner)
Must provide marketing information upon request
1992 Readopt all the rules from 1984
(DOT) Require equal service enhancements (including the system
owner)
Institute mandatory participation rule
Prohibit minimum number of bookings clause
Prohibit restrictions on use of third-party hardware, software and
databases.
Require disclosure of contents of each CRS-airline fee
arrangement to all airlines.
1997 Readopt all the rules from 1992
Modify and extend display bias prohibition
Prohibit parity clauses
1997 Postpone sunset dates annually from March 1997 to March 2003,
to then to January 2004
2003
Dec. Terminate all rules in January 2004, except for display bias and
2003 parity rules, which are scheduled for termination in July 2004.
Add prohibition against CRS refusals to deal with airlines that do
not provide best fares (also scheduled for termination in July
2004).
It is instructive to examine how CRS vendors' views on the
regulations have evolved over the past several years. In 1997, all four
existing CRSs-Sabre, Worldspan, Amadeus, and Galileo-supported
some level of continued or heavier regulation.76 By 2000, CRSs began
76 The comments filed with the DOT by the CRSs at that time were filled with justifications
for continuing or modifying the CRS rules. See GALILEO INTERNATIONAL, L.L.C., COMMENTS OF
GALILEO INTERNATIONAL, L.L.C. IN RESPONSE TO ADVANCE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING 2-4
(Dec. 11, 1997), available at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf24/29607_web.pdf; SABRE INC.,
COMMENTS OF THE SABRE GROUP, INC. 2-3 (Dec. 9, 1997), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf24/29503_web.pdf, SYSTEM ONE AMADEUS L.L.C., COMMENTS OF
SYSTEM ONE AMADEUS L.L.C. 2-4 (Dec. 9, 1997), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf24/29507_web.pdf; WORLDSPAN, L.P., COMMENTS OF
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facing some competition from newly emerged technologies such as Orbitz,
Expedia, and airline websites; these sites facilitated direct ticket sales that
bypassed brick-and-mortar travel agents. SABRE, Worldspan, and
Amadeus asked the DOT to regulate Orbitz and other Internet ticketing
technologies, as well as continuing CRS regulation. 7 Galileo was the only
party who saw no need to regulate the new Internet technologies. The
DOT, noting that regulating new technologies might discourage further
innovation, decided not to regulate Orbitz or other Internet technologies.
Subsequently, in recent years, Sabre, Worldspan, and Amadeus have all
been campaigning for complete deregulation of CRSs. Meanwhile, Galileo
remained a loner in supporting continued regulation of CRS until the
prospect of deregulation became more certain.
II. The Initial Case for Regulation: A Review of the Merits
Under traditional theories of regulation, deregulation should occur
when the social costs of continued regulation outweigh the benefits.
Deregulation is then said to improve resource allocation, or social
welfare. 78 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 2003
provided updated guidance for federal agencies to follow in evaluating the
allocative efficiency, or general merit, of proposed projects and
regulations. 79 The OMB highlighted three basic principles. First, the
WORLDSPAN, L.P. ON ADVANCE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING 2-3 (Dec. 9, 1997), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf24/29525_web.pdf.
77 See AMADEUS GLOBAL TRAVEL DISTRIBUTION, S.A., INITIAL COMMENTS OF AMADEUS
GLOBAL TRAVEL DISTRIBUTION, S.A. (Sept. 22, 2000), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf53/111729_web.pdf; SABRE INC., COMMENTS OF SABRE INC. (Sept.
22, 2000), available at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf53/112014 web.pdf; WORLDSPAN, L.P.,
COMMENTS OF WORLDSPAN, L.P. (Sept. 22, 2000), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf52/111712_web.pdf.
78 The economic foundation for methods of evaluating whether a government project or
regulation benefits the public can generally be found in the works of Nicholas Kaldor and JR. Hicks.
See JR. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor,
Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939);
see also Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway
and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938). By a Kaldor-Hicks standard, a project is welfare-
enhancing if the gains to private beneficiaries of the project exceed the costs to any parties made worse
off by the project. For the modem history of cost-benefit analysis, see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A.
Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999).
79 The OMB is charged with the task of reviewing the adequacy of federal agency
determinations of whether a program or project will benefit the public generally. See OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, CIRCULAR A-4 (Sept. 17, 2003) (refining
OMB's "best practices" document of 1996 and "assist[ing] analysts in the regulatory agencies by
defining good regulatory analysis . . . and standardizing the way benefits and costs of Federal
regulatory actions are measured and reported"). Some of the peer reviewers of this document
contemporaneously published articles on the conduct of cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness To Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205 (2004). For a useful
perspective on cost-benefit analysis methods at the time of the 1996 document, see KENNETH J.
ARROW ET AL., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION: A
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1996).
390
Economics of Regulatory Reform
analysis must identify the specific goal of the regulation; second, it must
identify a benchmark against which to measure the costs and benefits of
the regulation; and third, it must evaluate the costs and benefits of the
regulation relative to that benchmark. Qualitative analysis of costs and
benefits of government intervention is consistent with OMB guidance and
with methods of market analysis typically applied in evaluating antitrust
complaints.8 0
At its inception, the social value of CRS regulation most plausibly
derived from its capacity to reduce the social costs of potential
bottlenecks 8l in the supply of flight information and ticket distribution
services. Travel agents and airlines initially faced two incumbent CRS
suppliers. Other sources of flight information and ticket distribution-such
as the OAG, for instance-tended not to be close substitutes from the
perspectives of airlines and travel agents. CRS regulations sought to
confront incumbent CRS suppliers with greater competitive pressure while
preventing adverse effects on the structure of the market for passenger air
travel, which might occur if non-CRS-owning airlines could not profitably
compete with CRS-owning airlines. 82 Furthermore, the DOT has
characterized its CRS rules as promoting conduct consistent with the
antitrust and consumer protection laws. 83 These expressly-anticipated
economic benefits from the 1984 CRS rules, and from subsequent
revisions to those rules, are documented in DOT Notices for Proposed
Rulemaking ("NPRMs") filed in 1984, 1992, 1997, and 2002. In each
NPRM, the DOT provides its rationale for promulgating or modifying its
CRS rules.
In this Part, we review the initial case for CRS regulation from a best-
case or proponent perspective. The goal is to identify the market
conditions and assumptions about the economic consequences of the CRS
regulations that plausibly supported the ex ante expectation that CRS
80 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(1992).
81 What we term bottlenecks arise in settings where customers have few good alternative
sources of supply, entry appears unlikely to occur, and suppliers thus face incentives to raise prices
above what they would charge otherwise. The possible social harm from this is that less of the good or
service is consumed than if there are more suppliers or if incumbent suppliers face a greater threat of
competition from new entrants.
82 For example, if airlines that did not own CRS systems could not compete profitably with
CRS-owning airlines, the advent of CRS technology could significantly reduce the number of airlines
and thereby create incentives for the remaining airlines to raise their prices, causing a decline in the
quantity of passenger air travel consumed. Even if non-CRS-owning airlines could profitably compete,
higher prices could accompany a CRS-related increase in market concentration due to the advantages
accruing to major airlines from their CRS ownership.
83 In 1984, the CAB's strategy was two-pronged for preventing CRS technology from
adversely affecting the structure of the airline market: first, eliminating entry barriers; and second,
limiting airline influence over CRSs. With the passage of time, the DOT placed greater emphasis on a
third rationale, which was to ensure the enforcement of laws designed to promote competition and
protect consumers more generally.
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regulation would be socially beneficial.
A. Reducing Entry Barriers into Markets for CRS Services 84
The first primary goal of CRS regulation was to encourage entry--or
eliminate "barriers to entry" 85-both by preventing travel agents from
becoming locked into incumbent CRS vendors and by making it easier for
new entrants to distribute flight information and provide booking services
for major airlines. At the rules' inception, several features of CRS markets
appeared to explain why potential suppliers had found entry unprofitable.
The CRS regulations can be understood as an attempt to alter these
features and thereby induce entry.
First, travel agents faced switching costs due to their existing
relationships or binding contracts with incumbent CRS vendors. If the
travel agent's switching cost could be reduced, an entrant potentially
would not have to offer a substantial discount off the incumbent supplier's
price in order to win the agent's business. Accordingly, the initial CRS
regulations disallowed long-term contracts, disallowed prohibitions against
a travel agent's use of third-party hardware and software, and disallowed
the use of other contractual provisions that appeared to lock customers into
an incumbent vendor and thereby discourage, or prevent, them from
switching suppliers.8 6
Second, incumbent vendors appeared to have a quality advantage due
to their ownership by major airlines. The most significant advantage was
that an airline-owned CRS could confidently commit to provide travel
agents with timely and complete ticket information about the owner
airline's flights. Among CRS-owning airlines, American and United
Airlines were major airlines in the sense that each commanded a large
share of the market for passenger air travel in the U.S. An entrant that
could be assured equal access to their flight information would not have to
overcome such a large quality disadvantage relative to the incumbents. To
reduce the quality advantage of the airline-owned incumbents, CRS
regulations required participation by all CRS-owning airlines in all CRS
84 See Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AMER. ECON. REv. 47-57 (1982) (reviewing
the various concepts of entry barriers that guided the antitrust and regulatory policy choices around the
promulgation of the first CRS regulations). Demsetz highlights the issue facing policymakers of"de-
fining which costs of undertaking activities are socially desirable and which are not." Id. at 56; see also
Dennis W. Carlton, Why Barriers to Entry Are Barriers to Understanding (2004) (unpublished manu-
script, presented at the American Economic Association Meetings, San Diego, 2004).
85 We use the expression to refer to anything that reduces the profitability of entry,
independently of how its elimination would affect allocative efficiency.
86 The 1984 CRS Rules and 1992 CRS Rules purported to regulate contracts between CRS
vendors and travel agents in order to reduce travel agents' costs for switching CRS vendors. These
included regulations against contracts with a duration greater than five years and against requiring
customers to use only the incumbent's hardware and software.
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vendors' systems.87
The regulations did not expressly address a third advantage that
incumbent CRS vendors enjoyed, however. Ownership and operation of
CRS systems appeared to increase owner airlines' ticket sales significantly
and profitably. Each CRS-owning airline should thus have found it
profitable to supply financing and other inputs to its CRS unit on more
generous terms than a CRS not owned by an airline would expect to
receive. This would place potential CRS entrants that were not owned by
airlines at a disadvantage. All of these considerations were cited by
proponents of CRS regulation that purported to ease entry by new CRSs,
particularly of CRSs not owned by airlines.
B. Limiting Airline Influence over CRSs
The second major goal of CRS regulation was to prevent airline
ownership of CRSs from adversely affecting competition among airlines in
markets for passenger air travel. Airlines complained that not owning
CRSs put them at a competitive disadvantage relative to owner airlines.
The CAB noted that "[since CRSs are] competitors in the downstream air
transportation industry, they have the ability and incentive to exercise that
power in ways that may interfere with air transport competition.
88
Vertical integration into the supply of CRS services could confer
several advantages on owner airlines that could affect competition in
markets for passenger air travel. First, as previously explained, CRS
vendors appeared to face significantly lower costs to serving their owner
airline than other airlines, partly because of similarities (and even co-
location) between their computer systems, and partly to the extent that
joint ownership facilitated coordination between airline and CRS
operations. This reduced the airline's cost of ticket distribution, made it
easier for travel agents and passengers to obtain information and tickets on
the owner airline, and lead passengers to associate a higher quality of
service with that airline.
Second, airline ownership may have altered the affected CRS
vendors' incentives when setting prices and other aspects of competition
strategy in a way that favored the owner airlines. As the sole owner, an
airline presumably held all residual rights to control, and participate in the
cash flows of, its CRS unit. From the owner airline's perspective, the best
87 The "mandatory participation" rule required that all CRS-owning airlines provide flight
information and otherwise "participate" in other CRS systems in the sense of accepting bookings
through those systems. The mandatory participation rule was an attempt to increase the quality of the
ticket distribution services that an entrant could offer by preventing airlines that owned CRS vendors
from refusing to distribute tickets and related information through the new entrant.
88 1984 CRS Rules, supra note 61, at 32,542.
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strategy for the CRS's management would have been to maximize the
profits of the airline and the CRS jointly, rather than to focus solely on the
profits of the CRS. The owner airline could implement this objective by,
for example, appointing an agent of the airline to the CRS management
team or by exercising appropriate discretion in setting the compensation of
the CRS's management. This raised the concern that the airline-owned
CRSs would be given powerful incentives to favor their owners in
marketing and booking flights, at the other airlines' expense.
Concerns about these advantages of CRS ownership may have been
valid, but they would not generally be enough to justify regulations to
eliminate airline influence over CRSs. The possibility of harm from
vertical integration cannot be denied. Yet vertical integration can also
improve economic efficiency. Economists generally recognize that
organizing production within a single corporation rather than attempting to
coordinate activities across corporations can confer efficiencies that
include significant reduction of transaction costs. 89 The CAB recognized
the benefits of integration when it enumerated four main reasons for not
ordering divestiture in 1984: (i) the necessity was not clear, and the
general rules appeared to be sufficient guards against anticompetitive
behavior; (ii) divestiture cases would require adjudicatory-type hearings
which could take long periods of time and be very costly; (iii) there was an
obvious efficiency gain from the vertical integration, which was not clearly
offset by the potential harm; and (iv) if necessary, divestiture could be
pursued at a later time.9° Regulators thus had good reason to reject such
proposals and not attempt to regulate airlines' internal governance of their
CRS units.
Regulations to prevent airline ownership of CRSs from adversely
affecting competition between airlines were accordingly limited to
prohibitions against specific practices that had been the subject of
complaints by competing airlines and practices that did not clearly
improve market efficiency. Various forms of discrimination by any CRS
or its owner against a non-affiliated airline or other CRS were accordingly
prohibited. 91 This included prohibitions against display bias and the
89 An extensive literature has arisen from Ronald Coase's insight that transaction cost
savings can accrue from organizing production within firms (corporations), rather than across firms.
According to Coase, such savings are critical to the profitability of the business firm as an
organizational form. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 1 (1937), reprinted
in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33, 38-40 (1988). Modem extensions of
this point, focusing on vertical integration, include those of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, and
Grossman and Hart. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart,
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON.
691 (1986).
90 See 1984 NPRM, supra note 3, at 11,661.
91 The absence of obvious efficiency rationales for such conduct is not surprising:
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requirements that each CRS charge all airlines the same fee for a given
quality of service, that no CRS discriminate among airlines in setting its
quality of service, and that every CRS supply to all airlines whatever
marketing data it supplies to the owner airline.
The potential benefit from these rules was not simply to prevent
discrimination. They also were designed to prevent airline ownership from
affecting CRS vendors' choices in ways that might diminish airlines'
incentives to compete and so make travelers worse off or limit market
efficiency. One regulatory prohibition against discrimination, however, is
not readily explained as an attempt to affect competition between airlines.
The expressed goal of the 1997 prohibition against the use of parity
clauses was to facilitate innovation in the quality of CRS services. The
concerns about possible effects of parity clauses on innovation were not
linked to airlines' ownership of CRS systems.
C. General Compliance: Antitrust and Consumer Protection
Beyond the two major goals of CRS regulation discussed above, the
DOT has suggested that CRS regulations may also be useful in enforcing
general compliance with antitrust and consumer protection statutes. Given
that at least two large federal agencies have the task of protecting
consumers from violations of these statutes in a wide range of markets, the
social value of CRS regulation to this end is the incremental value of
adding enforcement of regulatory rules to other well-established
mechanisms for enforcing compliance with antitrust and consumer
protection statutes.
1. Antitrust
One of the anticipated benefits of CRS regulation in 1984 was to
remedy harmful antitrust misconduct, thereby promoting specific and
general deterrence of such misconduct. The value of CRS regulation as a
deterrent changed when the DOJ gained antitrust enforcement authority
over the airline industry. This observation does not alter the anticipated
enforcement benefits of the initial regulation, but it does affect our analysis
Economic analyses of price discrimination tend to find that it has ambiguous implications for social
welfare, primarily because the practice benefits some parties while harming others, and the net effect
depends on what weights are assigned in combining the values of those benefits and harms. For
potential benefits and harms of price discrimination, see JACK HIRSCHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 244-49 (4th ed. 1998); see also JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 135-38 (1998). For alternative discussions of the literature on price discrimination, see
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 274-96 (2000);
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 384-87 (2001); Michael E. Levine,
Price Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2002).
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of the present-day benefits. We return to this issue more generally in Part
IV.
2. Consumer Protection
The value of CRS regulation as a means of "consumer protection" is
difficult to discern from the record. Prohibitions against display and
functionality bias might further such a goal in the sense of improving the
quality of consumer information or, put differently, reducing asymmetries
between the quality of consumer and producer information. Yet, as we
have seen, those prohibitions arose primarily to prevent airlines from using
their CRS units to undermine the structure of markets in which airlines
compete, which is traditionally a goal of antitrust enforcement, rather than
reflecting any distinct consumer-protection enforcement objective.
In a 1986 Brookings Institution study of airline regulation, for
example, Morrison and Winston illustrate the social cost of biased displays
with a numerical example in which "CRS bias can be assumed, in effect,
to eliminate one major carrier., 92 In rejecting the claims that display bias
may be innocuous or "beneficent," the DOT has cited examples in which
airline-owned CRSs displayed the flights of competing airlines so that they
would be difficult for travel agents to locate, sometimes with the intent of
causing a competing airline to exit a local market for passenger air travel.93
This stands in contrast to the view that display bias rules primarily help
travel agents and consumers obtain timely and accurate information in
order to find more suitable flights at a lower cost, thereby achieving a
distinct consumer-protection enforcement objective.
Thus, the record reveals little about the market conditions under
which the CAB or DOT would impose a regulation solely to improve the
quality of consumer information. For an understanding of the possible
social value of consumer protection regulation in the CRS industry, we
accordingly consider the nature of the DOT's authority to promulgate
consumer-protection rules.
Congress never explicitly granted the CAB (or the DOT) authority to
ensure consumer protection. 94 Instead, Section 411 of the Federal
92 STEVEN A. MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE
DEREGULATION 69 (1986).
93 For example, the DOT in its 1992 NRPM rejects the argument of Boudreaux and Ellig,
and of Kleit, that display bias might be benign in light of examples that include the following: "When
New York Air entered one of America's major markets, American substantially increased the display
bias against all New York Air services, an action that led to New York Air's withdrawal from the
market. 56 FR 12593." 1992 CRS Rules, supra note 28, at 43,786.
94 According to the 2002 NPRM, Congress mentioned three particular goals to the DOT as
furthering public interests: (i) "the prevention of predatory or anticompetitive practices in the airline
industry"; (ii) "the prevention of unreasonable industry concentration, excessive market domination,
monopoly powers, and other conditions that would allow an airline unreasonably to increase fares,
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Aviation Act 95 authorized the CAB (and the DOT) to prohibit "unfair" and
"deceptive practices" and "unfair methods of competition" by airlines and
ticket agents in the sale of air transportation. The CAB justified its
authority to protect consumers by giving a parallel reading of this statute
with Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, which
contained similar language. 96 The FTC's enforcement actions against
unfair or deceptive practices have tended to focus on activity that is seen
as threatening consumers' opportunities to exercise informed choice.
It is thus appropriate to consider that CRS regulations against display
and functionality bias might confer social benefits by improving consumer
access to information about their travel alternatives. This topic has indeed
been a focus of commentary about the value of CRS regulations, even
while the DOT has not offered the value of improved information access,
without more, as a primary source of gain from any of its proposed CRS
regulations.
97
III. CRS Regulation Today: Smaller Benefits, Higher Costs
We now consider the changes that have occurred in the structure of
CRS markets and determine how those changes affect the value of CRS
regulation in terms of achieving the initially stated goals. As mentioned
above, our approach is conservative in the sense that we assume that
proponents' views on the nature of the net benefits from CRS regulation
were initially valid, given what was known at the time. The analysis
accordingly focuses on the factors that we identified in Part II as plausibly
supporting claims that the initial CRS regulations were in the social
reduce service, or exclude competition"; and (iii) "the encouragement of entry by new and existing air
carriers." 2002 NPRM, supra note 5, at 69,384.
95 49 U.S.C. § 41,712(a) (2001).
96 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2001). Meanwhile, the 1984
NPRM read:
Section 411 was patterned-indeed is virtually identical to-section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act and as the Supreme Court has noted, has the same
general purposes. . . .The companion prohibition against "unfair or deceptive
practices" in both section 411 and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
was intended to protect consumer from trade practices which, while not
necessarily anticompetitive, were misleading, contrary to recognized public policy
or injurious to consumers .... Given the prophylactic intention of section 411, it is
appropriate for us to use section 411 as the basis for prospective rules. It permits
us to forestall conduct where we find that a potential for abuse exists. We need
not, therefore, determine whether there actually has been a violation of section 411
in order to promulgate rules.
1984 NPRM, supra note 3, at 11,653.
97 Donald J. Boudreaux and Jerry Ellig provide an early discussion of the different forms
that CRS display "bias" can take and the market conditions under which CRS vendors choose how to
display flight information. See Donald J. Boudreaux & Jerome Ellig, Beneficent
Bias: The Case Against Regulating Airline Computerized Reservation Systems, 57 J. AIR L. & COM.
567, 576-80 (1992)
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interest. We focus on how the merits of regulation have changed over the
past two decades under a traditional cost-benefit standard. The analysis in
this section nevertheless brings to light certain weaknesses in proponents'
initial assumptions about the potential for CRS regulation to achieve its
expressed goals. Such weaknesses have become more apparent with the
passage of time as general knowledge has grown about markets for
electronic ticket distribution.
A. CRS Divestiture by Domestic Airlines
The initial concern that major airlines might use their CRS ownership
as a device to impose extra costs on competitors, or exclude them from the
market, has lost its validity. As of 2003, all major domestic U.S. airlines
had divested their CRS ownership. 98 This is a recent development.
Continental Airlines divested its final 12.4% equity stake in the successor
to System One, Amadeus, in 1999 (around the date of Amadeus' IPO).
Ownership of the two CRSs that had raised the greatest concerns about
airline influence over electronic ticket distribution, Sabre and Apollo, was
divested gradually over more than a decade. Sabre was spun off from
American in March 2000. The successor to Apollo, Galileo, was fully
divested by United Airlines and others in October 2001.
Ownership of other CRS vendors has been divested fully over the past
five years by domestic airlines. Delta, Northwest and TWA sold off their
stakes in the successor to PARS and Datas II, Worldspan, in a transaction
leading to Worldspan's acquisition in June 2003 by a company with no
airline ownership, Travel Transaction Processing Corp. 99 These
divestitures end an era of domestic-airline ownership of CRSs that had
raised concerns about the use of CRS ownership as a means for airlines to
adversely affect competition in the market for passenger air travel. This
completely eliminates the potential for major airlines to abuse their CRS
ownership.
There have been attempts to reconstruct the vertical integration and
airline influence argument despite the divestitures. 100 Most promising
among them is the argument that ownership is not necessary for a major
airline to adversely affect a CRS supplier's choices. The claim is that a
major airline could contractually or tacitly create an incentive for CRS
suppliers to discriminate against the airline's competitors in markets for
CRS services, and that this might in turn adversely affect competition in
98 2002 NPRM, supra note 5, at 69,373; Worldspan, History of Worldspan, at
http://www.worldspan.com/home.asp?fpageid=7&fbucatlD= (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
99 See History of Worldspan, supra note 99.
100 See, e.g., 2002 NPRM, supra note 5, at 69,383 (describing existing contractual
relationships between CRSs and their formerly-affiliated airlines).
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the market for passenger air travel.
This argument has several difficulties. First of all, divestiture
significantly increases an airline's private cost of exercising influence over
a CRS vendor, making the harmful exercise of influence significantly less
likely than in the case of airline ownership. This private cost goes beyond
the monitoring cost and the cost of negotiating and drafting such contracts.
Certainly, there are similarities between contracts and ownership, and
economic theories of the modem business corporation highlight their
interface.' 0l A corporation may indeed be viewed as a nexus of contracts
between the corporation and related parties, such as investors and
employees. But the distinction between ownership and contracts is that
ownership confers residual rights of control that contracts cannot confer.'12
By divesting its CRS ownership, an airline divests rights of control that it
cannot re-acquire through a contract. Any CRS that acts to maximize the
profits it earns jointly with its owner airline, pre-divestiture, will thus shift
its strategy to place less weight on the airline's profits, post-divestiture.
This is because the divestiture of ownership deprives the airline not only of
direct influence, but also of efficient means by which to shape CRS
incentives. In addition, even if an airline were to find a sufficient contract
for influencing a CRS vendor, the airline would have to provide the CRS
vendor with an adequate incentive to sign the contract, which could prove
difficult if the effect were to increase the airline's post-contractual
bargaining power relative to that of the CRS. t°3 The ultimate effect in this
case would be a form of price competition that tends to dissipate rents
previously accruing to airlines.
An airline also might seek to influence a CRS vendor through some
tacit understanding, rather than by means of a contract. As in any collusive
101 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 90, at 34-40 (comparing and contrasting the use of contracts
versus firm); Grossman & Hart, supra note 90, at 691-719; Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights
and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1119-58 (1990); Klein et al., supra note 90, at 297-
326; Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,
22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 233-61 (1979).
102 See Grossman & Hart, supra note 90.
103 This is not to deny the possibility of social loss from the use of long-term vertical
contracts. Voluntary contracts can in principle lead to socially harmful exclusion of suppliers under
some conditions; it is possible for exclusionary contracts to be both profitable and socially undesirable.
After initial skepticism on the part of economists about whether a voluntary exclusionary contract
could ever be profitable, which is usually attributed to "the Chicago School," recent research has
identified some conditions under which "monopolists may be able to exploit customer disorganization
so as to exclude potential rivals." Eric B. Rasmusen et al., Naked Exclusion, 81 Am. EcoN. REv. 1137,
1137 (1991). These conditions include economies of scale and certain beliefs on the part of consumers
about others' actions. For instance, buyers who expect others to sign such provisions will see no
reason not to sign those contracts themselves. For more information on naked exclusion, see id.; see
also llya R. Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Naked Exclusion: Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 296
(2000); Eric B. Rasmusen et al., Naked Exclusion: Reply, 90 A. ECON. REv. 310 (2000). For the
perspective usually attributed to the Chicago School, see, for example, Aaron Director & Edward H.
Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. ReV. 281 (1956).
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arrangement, the airline might find a way to compensate the CRS vendor
tacitly for placing its competitors at a disadvantage in the market for CRS
services. For example, the airline might pay the CRS vendor a premium
over the market price for CRS services in exchange for the CRS vendor
placing the airline's competitors at a disadvantage-through the levying of
high CRS booking fees, for example-in the market for passenger air
travel. Assuming such an agreement would be mutually beneficial, the
airline and CRS vendor must each be able to engage in sufficient
monitoring of the other's compliance to deter cheating, and all the more so
absent an explicit contract. 104 The issues in forming, monitoring, and
enforcing compliance with a tacit coordinated agreement can be restrictive,
similar to those that arise in the case of contracting. The potential for any
harmful exercise of influence by an airline over a CRS vendor is thus
significantly lower post-divestiture than when the CRS unit is airline-
owned.
Finally, this argument ignores the fact that just as it is more costly for
an airline to exercise influence over a CRS unit that it does not own, it also
is more costly for the government to write rules that can successfully
prevent the harmful exercise of influence through such contractual, or
worse still, tacit channels. Any rule that sets out to govern contract terms
between a CRS and an airline risks prohibiting relations that are actually
beneficial and does not ensure the cessation of harm. First, the rule may
be difficult to enforce. Second, regulated parties may find ways to avoid
complying with the rule in principle without technically violating it.'05
These difficulties, taken together, indicate that the net benefits to society
from writing command-and-control regulations to prevent the
anticompetitive exercise of influence over CRSs by non-owner airlines are
significantly smaller than the pre-divestiture net benefits associated with
the initial rule.
There is another, and perhaps more important, point. As global CRS
alliances formed, the CRS vendors that had been formed by major
domestic airlines began to emerge as separate and distinct lines of business.
When the CRS rules were first written, CRS units were found to generate
profits primarily by increasing bookings on their owner airlines. A decade
later, the booking fees were accounting for a significant share of CRS-
generated profit. By the turn of the millennium, "strained" relations were
reported between the largest CRS supplier, Sabre, and its airline-owner,
104 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. EcoN. 44, 44-46 (1964); Edward J.
Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, 52
ECONOMETRICA 87, 87-100 (1984).
105 For discussion of problems that can arise in enforcing rules against certain forms of
contract between CRSs and travel agents, see DOJ COMMENTS, supra note 10, at 28.
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American Airlines. 106 Sabre was completely spun off from American
Airlines' parent company, AMR, in 2000, amid talk that independence
from AMR would better enable Sabre to compete for business generally.
10 7
In short, the divestiture changed not only CRS ownership structures
but also reflected changes in the conditions under which CRS units could
profitably compete. Major CRS vendors today compete by taking
advantage of scale and scope economies that are achievable by offering
not only airline reservation services but also hotel reservations, rental cars,
and discount programs. That said, it remains possible that these changes
reflect the effect of the CRS rules not in facilitating entry but in preventing
major airlines from using their CRSs to compete in the air travel market.
By limiting the ability of CRSs to pay their costs by increasing their owner
airlines' bookings, the CRS rules may have caused CRS vendors to incur
more costs competing in the ticket-distribution market more generally.
B. No Entry by New CRS Vendors
The CRS rules purporting to facilitate new CRS entry appear not to
have done so, and have thus not produced the expected benefits. Only six
CRS vendors offered their services to domestic airlines and travel agents
in the mid-1980s, as Table 2 shows. If the rules had actually facilitated
entry, the number of CRS vendors should have grown or some new
entrants should have been seen during the past twenty years. The evidence,
however, is to the contrary. It remains that "[s]ince the [CAB] first
adopted CRS rules, no firm has entered the CRS business."' 08 Meanwhile,
there has been a series of mergers coupled with introduction of
multinational CRS; the cumulative effect was to reduce the number of
CRSs. 109 Today there are mainly four CRSs: Sabre, Worldspan, Galileo,
and Amadeus. While it is possible that there would be even fewer CRS
106 See Scott McCartney, Sabre's Durham Resigns Amid Flap with AMR Corp., WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 8, 1999, at B2 (citing coordination difficulties between the CRS unit of American Airlines,
Sabre, and the parent corporation, AMR).
107 American Airlines divested its remaining stake through an IPO of 19% that occurred in
July 1996.
108 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 980. While Worldspan, Galileo, and Amadeus did not
exist as such in 1983, they were formed through various mergers and acquisitions, and thus were never
de novo entrants. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
109 European airlines formed alliances in response to entry by American CRS vendors and,
through these alliances, developed their own CRS service suppliers. Amadeus was formed by Air
France, Iberia, Lufthansa and SAS in 1987. Galileo was formed in 1988 through an alliance that
included the Apollo system. Its initial owners included British Airways, United Airlines, Alitalia,
Swissair, and KLM. The 1990 formation of Worldspan occurred through a merger of the two smallest
American CRS suppliers, Pars, then owned by TWA and Northwest, and Datas-lI, then owned by
Delta. Mergers subsequently occurred between other domestic CRS vendors and their European
counterparts. Galileo completed its acquisition of Apollo in 1994. Amadeus merged with System One
in 1995.
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vendors today in the absence of regulation, this result seems unlikely. If
these rules have not led to any entry after almost twenty years, it seems
unlikely that any benefits will arise from keeping them in place in the
future.
Even if a regulation could successfully facilitate entry by a supplier of
CRS services, the gain from such entry would at this point be relatively
small, and possibly negative. Whereas twenty years ago-when Internet
services were not developed and CRSs faced little outside competition-
the benefit of new entry into the CRS market may have been substantial,
any benefit has likely decreased due to the increased market pressures that
CRS vendors today face from alternative channels. In this light, the
potential for unintended adverse effects, such as the possible suppression
of innovation, raises the possibility that the maintenance of regulations that
purport to encourage entry would inadvertently yield greater social costs
than benefit, even assuming that the regulations were socially beneficial
when they were first promulgated. Thus, the DOJ is correct to point out
that "when the risk level [of eliminating particular rules] is uncertain, it
will often be most appropriate to rely on law enforcement on a case-by-
case basis to deal with anticompetitive conduct, rather than on industry-
wide regulation."
' 10
Given that the CAB assigned high priority to promoting entry when it
issued the first CRS rules, it might seem a bit puzzling that no new CRS
vendors have entered the market. The up-front cost of entry and the scale a
CRS vendor must achieve to operate profitably are clearly substantial. But
these challenges were presumably all known to the CAB when it wrote the
rules.
A better explanation might be that the CAB overestimated the role
that certain contracting practices had played, and might continue to play,
in preventing entry. The CAB's strategy for facilitating CRS entry was to
prevent airline-owned CRSs from "locking" travel agents into CRS service
contracts. In doing so, the CAB sought to limit both the switching costs of
travel agents and the first-mover advantages of certain airlines, both of
which were then thought to inhibit entry.
CRS regulations sought to facilitate entry primarily by restricting the
kinds of contracts that CRSs could enter into with travel agents.
Prohibitions against exclusivity were designed to allow travel agents to
procure the services of more than one CRS vendor at a time. Along with
limits on contract duration, these rules were designed to cause CRS
vendors to compete for an individual agent's business on a day-to-day or
even minute-to-minute basis. Yet travel agents typically prefer to deal with
one CRS vendor at a time, regardless of CRS rules, and this tendency
110 DOJ COMMENTS, supra note 10, at 18.
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appears likely to persist.1 ' The American Society of Travel Agents has
noted that "most travel agencies will never need, want or use multiple
CRSs-multiple system use is a pipedream." 2 This tendency reflects the
cost and inconvenience, relative to the benefits, to a travel agent of
acquiring and operating a second system. For example, costs of training
employees to operate a second system can be prohibitive. Only relatively
large travel agencies find it beneficial to operate multiple systems." 3
The prohibited contracting practices-long-term contracting and
exclusive dealing-that had been regarded as exclusionary might not have
proved to be such a critical barrier to entry: entry did not occur,
independently of those practices. Evidence on the dealings between travel
agents and CRS vendors, post-regulation, suggests that these practices may
have enhanced overall allocative efficiency. Travel agents appear to have
agreed to some, if not all, restrictive contracts with CRS vendors as a
means of providing those vendors with assurance that they would be
repaid gradually, over time, for their up-front investments in the travel
agent, such as investments in equipment or training.
In addition, the one-CRS vendor tendency of travel agents is
consistent with the existence of healthy competition. Rather than compete
on a minute-by-minute basis, CRS vendors have tended to compete with
one another for multi-year travel agency contracts, the terms of which
depend partly on how much of the up-front hardware and software costs
are bome by the CRS rather than the travel agent. Shorter-term contracts
appear to reflect greater assumption of up-front costs by travel agents,
consistent with conventional economic theories of contract. This form of
competition between CRS vendors, however, would not extend to CRS
competition with Internet ticket distribution systems, as we will explain.
111 "The commenters generally agree... that the great majority of travel agencies will use a
single system, not multiple systems." 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 1001.
112 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TRAVEL AGENTS, INC., COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF TRAVEL AGENTS, INC. 22 (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf85/237445_web.pdf.
113 "Agency dependency on one system is... driven.., by the complications of managing
passenger data in multiple systems .... Those complexities require management staff and integration
software that is generally only within the reach of very large agencies with multi-regional or global
reach." Id at 24.
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The dynamic nature of the competition facing CRS suppliers becomes
more apparent from a global perspective. It is true that travel agents and
airlines today have fewer CRS vendors to choose from. Among the four
CRS vendors that serve domestic travel agents today, Sabre and
Worldspan still account for over seventy percent of domestic CRS
revenues. Nonetheless, the markets are not identical, and restricting our
attention to the U.S. market can give a misleading impression of the nature
of competition on a world basis. As shown by Table 3, world CRS shares
indeed differ significantly from the United States-only shares. The global
dimension of CRS markets likely affects many, if not all, CRS decisions
about competition strategy.

















114 1984 NPRM, supra note 3, at 11,649.
115 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 979-81 (citing Margaret Guerin-Calvert et al.,
Economic Analysis of DOT Proposals To Change the CRS Rules 18 (Mar. 15, 2003), in GALILEO INT'L,
APPENDIX TO COMMENTS OF GALILEO INTERNATIONAL IN RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf85/237372.web.pdf).
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C. More Substitutes for CRS: Smaller Gain from Regulation
Although the number of CRS suppliers has declined over the past
decade, simple statistics on supplier concentration, or the number of
suppliers, can be misleading.'16 Alternate means of ticket distribution have
emerged, and, unlike the situation in 1984, travelers now have close
substitutes for CRS channels. Direct-to-traveler electronic ticket
distribution services now constitute a significant option for travelers to use
as an alternative to CRS-dependent travel agent services (airline call
centers have always been a substitute). Figures 2 and 3 are diagrammatic
representations of the modem information and payment flows involving
CRSs, which should be compared with Figure 1 from Section I.A.
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Let us closely examine the various channels available for
distributing flight information and bookings as of 2004. First of all, in
addition to traditional brick-and-mortar travel agencies, there are now
many online travel agencies. The most prominent of them are Travelocity,
Expedia, and Orbitz. Travelocity is owned by Sabre and uses Sabre as its
CRS vendor. The site allows consumers to make reservations for flights,
116 See generally GEORGE J. STIGLER, The Measurement of Concentration, in THE
ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 29, 29 (1968) ("[It] is ... clear that the degree of competition would
vary more closely with the number of potential rivals than with the number of actual rivals."); W. KIP
VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 5 (3d ed. 2000) ("[O]ne major
consideration [in thinking about monopolies] is not simply how big a firm currently is and what its
current market influence is, but rather the extent to which there is a possible entry from a competitor.").
405
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hotels, rental cars, cruises, and other vacation plans. Consumers can search
for flights by lowest fare or by specific dates. Travelocity also offers last-
minute deals for vacation packages. Expedia is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of InterActiveCorp and uses Worldspan as its primary CRS vendor. Orbitz
was launched in June 2001 as a joint venture among the five largest United
States airlines (American, United, Northwest, Delta, and Continental), and
thirty-seven additional airlines participate in the program; Orbitz uses
Worldspan. To the extent that these online agencies still use a CRS to
provide fare information, however, their competitive significance in
constraining the price and quality choices of incumbent vendors could be
limited.
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Orbitz and Expedia, however, have arrangements that should be
distinguished from "conventional" online agencies. Unlike Travelocity,
Expedia and Orbitz have been developing direct connection technologies
and allow bookings to be made directly with an airline's internal
reservation systems."' In other words, while Orbitz may rely on
Worldspan for some functions involved in the booking process, the Orbitz
website is essentially designed to limit airlines' reliance on CRSs and thus
to facilitate the flow of information directly to consumers, through the
Orbitz website.
All of the participating airlines have signed agreements with Orbitz
that effectively ensure that all publicly-available fares of these airlines,
representing nearly the entire domestic market, will be available through
117 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 980.
Vol. 21:369, 2004
Economics of Regulatory Reform
Orbitz. 118 Herein lies a key point: Because Orbitz, Travelocity, and
Expedia all provide similar services-and perhaps equally well-
consumers using Travelocity could easily switch over to Orbitz or Expedia
if booking an airline ticket through a CRS-based site were to become more
expensive than doing so through direct-connection technologies. In
particular, Orbitz has exhibited a dramatic growth over the past three years,
possibly at the expense of Travelocity, as shown by Figure 4.
Figure 4. Shares of Major Online Travel Services
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In addition to these online agencies, only some of which use a CRS,
almost all airlines today provide their own Internet sites through which
consumers can directly purchase low-cost flight tickets. Tables 4 and 5
provide some recent data on online ticketing revenues for most of these
airlines and the trend.
118 For details on the Charter Associate Agreement of Orbitz, see W.F. Adkinson & T.M.
Lenard, Orbitz: An Antitrust Assessment, 16 ANTrrRusT 76, 76-77 (Spring 2002).
119 Margaret Guerin-Calvert et al., Economic Analysis of DOT Proposals To Change the
CRS Rules 28 (Mar. 15, 2003) (on file with author) (citing MIDT Data, Shepherd Systems Inc.). The
graph depicts the shares of major online travel services until November, 2002. Since then, Expedia has
taken over the lead, with Travelocity and Orbitz being second and third, respectively. See, e.g.,
FORBESCOM, UPDATE 3-Orbitz Shares Lose 4 Pct on First Nasdaq Trade Day, Dec. 17, 2003,
available at http://www.forbes.com/newswire/2003/12/17/rtrl 184919.html.
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Table 4. Percentage of Revenues Booked Online (Jan-June 2002) l2


































In 2001, the Internet represented 14% of all airline sales for domestic
airlines, as shown in Table 6. Also by 2001, the share of online airline
ticket sales through websites (and not through online agencies) was
already 58%.122 Airlines have recently begun using their websites to offer
promotional fares, known as Web-only or e-fares. 123 These fares tend to be
5-10% below normal sale fares, and have become the standard selling
120 McAfee & Hendricks, supra note 15, app. at 9 tbl.9 (citing PhocusWright Report).
121 Steven C. Salop & John R. Woodbury, Economic Analysis of the DOT's NPRM
Proposals, app. at 9 (Mar. 17, 2003), in COMMENTS OF SABRE, INC., supra note 15 (citing
PHOCUSWRIGHT, INC., AIRLINE INTERNET SALES 2000-2001 AND FERST 6 MONTHS OF 2002).
122 2002 NPRM, supra note 5, at 69,376.
123 See id. at 69,370; see also id. at 69,373 ("While airlines initially offered their E-fares
exclusively through their own websites, Delta allows travel agents to book its E-fares through its
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price online. 124 A few highly successful low-cost airlines, such as
Southwest and JetBlue, had developed distribution strategies that rely less
heavily on travel agents (and therefore on CRSs) prior to the DOT
announcement of rule termination. The DOJ found that Southwest derived
only 20% of its revenue from tickets sold via travel agents; this compared
with 10% for JetBlue. 25 American Airlines and Delta have also developed
CRS bypass programs for agents. 26 These numbers are projected to rise.
Table 6 shows an industry projection that more than a third of airline ticket
sales will occur through the Internet by 2005.
Table 6. Airline Internet Gross Bookings, 2000-2005127
Projected Share (Percent)
'00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05
Airline Branded Websites 57 58 57 58 58 59
Intermediary Websites 43 42 43 42 42 41
Total Airline Online Travel 100 100 100 100 100 100
Airline Online Travel
as a percent of
Online Travel 59 57 54 52 50 49
Revenue 8 14 21 26 31 36
All of these changes affect the market for CRS services by giving
consumers, travel agents, and airlines-all of whom are necessary parties
to CRS-facilitated transactions-alternative sources of ticket distribution
that do not rely on the use of a CRS and that are closer substitutes for
distribution through CRSs than those that existed when the rules were first
promulgated.
The implications of this emergence of close substitutes for CRS-based
distribution are readily understood in terms of whether CRS services
constitute a "relevant market" in the antitrust sense. That is, would a
monopolist in the supply of CRS services find it profitable to institute a
small but significant and non-transitory increase in its price or fees? 128 The
124 See Adkinson & Lenard, supra note 119, at 78.
125 See DOJ COMMENTS, supra note 10, at 14fn.14.
126 Delta started an "Online Agency Service Center" that allowed agents to bypass CRSs.
Similarly, American Airlines introduced an "EveryFare" program. See id. at 17 n.23. The "EveryFare"
program offered "travel agencies access to American's webfares if they agreed to assume the airline's
booking fee liability." 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 989.
127 Guerin-Calvert et al., supra note 120, at 24 (citing table from PhoCus Wright Online
Travel Overview: Market Size and Forecasts 2002-2005, at tbl.3.1 (Feb. 2003)).
128 According to the DOJ's Horizontal Merger Guidelines:
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answer to this question in part depends on the extent to which consumers
regard CRS services as substitutes for the services that other suppliers
provide. Consider what would happen if one CRS were to raise its booking
fees or subscriber fees, according to the institutional arrangement
described in Figure 3. From the perspective of consumers, if any of these
costs are passed on to them, the alternatives to paying more for travel are
to switch to airline call centers or book tickets via airline websites or
online agencies that do not rely on the relevant CRS services. By making it
easier for consumers to compare prices across airlines and travel agencies,
the emergence of the Internet has placed downward pressure on fees and
fares. It is thus realistic to consider that a CRS vendor that raised its fares
would face loss of business not only to other CRSs but also to other
channels that include direct-to-airline bookings.
Alternatively, if the hypothetical price or fee increase were not passed
on to consumers, airlines and travel agents would face the burden
themselves. From the perspective of airlines that participate in that CRS,
their best alternative might be to more aggressively promote the online
distribution of tickets through their own websites, such as by offering
consumers special fare discounts in exchange for website bookings.' 2
Similarly, faced with hypothetical new subscriber fees, the travel agents
may turn to airline call centers or websites for bookings. The important
point here is that for a hypothetical monopolist in the supply of CRS
services to profitably increase its price, all three parties-airline, travel
agent, and consumer-must have an insufficient incentive to switch to
another CRS or another channel.
Market definition focuses solely on demand substitution factors .... A market is
defined as a product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is
produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to
price regulation, that was the only present and future producer or seller of those
products in that area likely would impose at least 'small but significant and
nontransitory' increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other products
are held constant. A relevant market is a group of products and a geographic area
that is no bigger than necessary to satisfy this test.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.0 (1997).
This is also consistent with antitrust law, which relies on "reasonable interchangeability" for defining
relevant markets. For example, in United States v. E.. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956), the Supreme Court declared that "[in considering what is the relevant market for determining
the control of price and competition, no more definite rule can be declared than that commodities
reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes make up that 'part of the trade or
commerce."' Id. at 395.
129 The magnitudes of these responses, and their effects on the likely profitability, of a CRS
vendor's price increase, have been the subject of a debate that is likely to continue into the future.
Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that airlines are unable to switch their flow of
bookings away from CRSs, even as discount airlines have successfully led increased numbers of
consumers to book travel electronically. For example, see Guerin-Calvert et al., supra note 120.
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Table 7. Ticket Distribution Channel Shares (Percent)
130
North America 1983 1987 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Agency Breakdown
Online 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.7 4.8 8.9 10.9
Corporate NA NA 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.0 1.6
Brick & Mortar NA NA 63.8 60.5 56.2 48.8 40.4




Offline/Call Center 12.0 12.6 NA 34.1 33.0 31.3 31.9
Online 0.0 0.0 NA 2.5 5.6 9.9 14.0
Total Direct 12.0 12.6 35.5 36.6 38.6 41.3 47.1
Bookings
A more complete analysis of the implications of the Internet for CRS
competition will require evidence beyond what we have reviewed here.
Such an analysis might attempt to estimate the cross-elasticity of demand
for CRS services relative to the alternative forms of distribution.131 Issues
to be resolved include whether substitution between Internet and brick-
and-mortar forms of ticket distribution is sufficient to discipline the pricing
of ticket distribution for all consumers, rather than just for those
consumers who face relatively low costs of booking directly with the
airline through the Internet. Table 7 illustrates the emergence of carrier-
direct bookings, which do not rely on travel agents that use CRSs, over the
past two decades. Between 1999 and 2002, carrier-direct bookings through
the Internet reportedly rose from 2.5 percent to 14.0 percent of the total.
Also, by 2002, the total carrier direct bookings accounted for nearly half of
all airline ticket distribution.
D. Greater Complexity: Higher Costs of Regulation
The changes examined in the previous Sections reflect increases in
the complexity of CRS markets and technology that have occurred over
the past decade. It is generally more costly for the government to intervene
in complex, dynamic markets than in simple, static ones. The changing
nature of the marketplace raises the possibility that regulation might have
130 McAfee & Hendricks, supra note 15, app. at 8 (citing data from 1984 NPRM, supra note
3, at 11,649, and 1992 CRS Rules, supra note 28, at 43,782).
131 Cross-elasticity of demand measures how much the quantity demanded of one good is
altered by changes in the price of another.
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adverse unintended consequences. Even if case-by-case intervention may
be a less costly solution overall, the costs of any type of intervention are
higher in complex and dynamic settings. Already in 1989, an observer
noted that "[e]ven if DOT adds more CRS rules to prevent alleged abuses,
no one thinks government will be able to catch up with competitive or
anti-competitive practices buried into something as complex and secretive
as CRS." '13 2 Richard Posner also has suggested that it would be appropriate
to devote more resources for antitrust enforcement-as opposed to drafting
regulation-as the Internet, or "new economy," sector grows relative to
other sectors of the economy.133
That the complexity of the markets in which CRS vendors compete
has grown over the past two decades is not surprising. The initial CRS
rules governed computer systems that were owned and operated by the
airlines that developed them. Though the leading edge of technology at the
time, the initial systems were also extensions of internal airline reservation
systems. The CAB had only recently phased out of regulating airlines,
whose CRSs were the subject of the new regulation. This eased the task of
developing and enforcing CRS regulations relative to what the DOT faces
today in determining whether concerns about market misconduct are best
met by continued application of legacy command-and-control regulations
of the type first promulgated by the CAB.
The effect of increased complexity is to reduce the net social benefit
of CRS regulation relative to what it was when the rules were first issued.
The DOT has said that it would not extend CRS-style regulations to the
new electronic ticket distribution channels134 that now enable travelers to
book tickets without the use of a travel agent. This is a good policy since it
prevents regulation from inadvertently impeding the advance of
technology. Future advances in the use of Internet-related technology in
distributing airline tickets (and related information) are likely, and this
progress is likely to occur more quickly in the absence of regulatory
constraints.
E. Consumer Protection Justification Is Questionable
The delay in termination of anti-bias rules reflects a lasting concern
on the part of the DOT and other commentators that display bias rules
might indeed be beneficial to consumers. The consumer-protection
argument against display bias is that it encourages travel agents to provide
poor service by relying upon, or providing, poor information when serving
132 Feldman, supra note 30.
133 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925 (2001).
134 2002 NPRM, supra note 5, at 69,410.
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consumers.1 35 The relevant concern is thus distinct from the argument that
such bias can aggravate antitrust-related harms from airline ownership of
CRSs. 13 6 The issue is that it can be costly for consumers to find good travel
agents and to monitor the quality of the services that travel agents provide.
By forcing the CRS vendor to put the best flight for each consumer at the
top of the display, a perfect regulator could make it easier for the travel
agent to provide the best quality of service and thereby reduce the
consumer's cost of monitoring the travel agent or, alternatively, of being
booked on flights that are unduly expensive or inconvenient.
It is difficult to reconcile this idealized view on how CRS regulation
improves the quality of consumer information, independently of airline
ownership, with the facts on how anti-bias regulations have evolved. First,
virtually all of the dramatic evidence on real consequences of display bias
comes from an era in which CRS vendors were owned and controlled by
major airlines, as previously explained. The DOT relied extensively on
such evidence when it rejected the arguments by Boudreaux and Ellig and
by Kleit that the practice of favoring one airline over another on the CRS
display need not be harmful and may be beneficial.
1 37
Second, as a practical matter, the DOT has only selectively prohibited
display bias. Displays that CRS vendors supply to corporate travel
departments are exempt from regulation. 138 Also exempt are special
displays that travel agents prepare for their employees to use in advising
individual consumers. The DOT has indeed considered and dismissed the
idea of prohibiting biases introduced by travel agents when advising
consumers on bookings.1 39 The DOT has in fact gone as far as to permit
airlines to distribute software that can introduce bias into displays.14  It is
thus unclear whether and to what extent the anti-bias regulations that the
DOT has proposed to terminate in July of 2004 have had any real effect on
135 Guerin-Calvert et al. discuss the potential for CRS regulation to eliminate the heightened
"agency costs" of consumers' reliance on travel agents who use CRSs. The underlying point is that
regulation to eliminate CRS display bias can be a good substitute for extra care on the consumer's part
in selecting a good travel agent and monitoring the quality of services that the travel agent provides.
See Guerin-Calvert et al., supra note 120; see also Boudreaux and Ellig, supra note 98.
136 See, e.g., 2004 Regulatory Assessment, supra note 1, at 27-28 ("[S]ystems that are no
longer owned by U.S. airlines would be unlikely to have an incentive of their own to provide untimely
or incorrect information on carriers.").
137 See supra note 93.
138 See 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 1000:
The existing rules . . . do not cover computer systems that do not provide all of
these functions, systems that are not owned or marketed by an airline or airline
affiliate, and system services that are not used by travel agencies (for example,
they do not cover CRSs when used by corporate travel departments). The rules
also do not govern the operations of traditional travel agencies or on-line travel
agencies.
139 See 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 1003.
140 Id. ("We will not adopt our proposals to bar airlines from distributing software that can
bias displays .... ).
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the quality of information consumers receive.
Further, the DOT has seemed unconcerned about travel agencies'
building bias into their own information displays. We have found no
reports of DOT enforcement actions against travel agents who fail to
disclose their biases to client travelers. The DOT has indeed expressly
declined to apply its anti-bias CRS rules to travel agent displays.14' The
DOT explains this decision by observing that "[t]he competitive pressures
on travel agencies should offset incentives to give customers misleading
advice."' 42
Perhaps concerned about possible harms arising from the DOT's
uneven approach to consumer protection in CRS regulation, the FTC filed
comments to the 2002 NPRM and showed that the FTC's legal doctrine
regarding consumer protection has changed over the years. In particular,
FTC remarked that "to justify a finding of unfairness, any consumer injury
must... not be outweighed by any offsetting benefits to consumers or
competition."'143  The FTC's position indicates that rules designed to
protect consumers by improving the quality of the information they receive
must not seriously undermine competition or reduce allocative efficiency.
Unfortunately, prohibiting display bias might do both of those while
failing to actually protect consumers.
To be sure, the DOT's decision to not prohibit biases that are
introduced by travel agents reflects its express observation that agents face
enough competition and travelers have enough good alternatives today that
a travel agent who consistently sells tickets of overpriced or otherwise ill-
suited flights is unlikely to survive unless all brick-and-mortar travel
agents were to collude to do so, which appears unlikely. In short, a travel
agent would accept a biased display and not bother to scroll down for
further options only if that agent believed the consumer would tend to be
indifferent to, or benefit from, this arrangement. Absent concerns about
travel agents' favoring one airline over another, 144 there is little reason to
141 According to the DOT, Lufthansa alleged that travel agencies commonly negotiated
preferred supplier arrangements with airlines and then used in-house software to bias the displays in
favor of those airlines. Midwest Express claimed that American Express provided biased displays to its
travel agents, which downgraded the flights offered by Midwest Express and other airlines that were
not among American Express's preferred airlines, and that American Express would not book a non-
preferred airline unless the customer specifically asked to fly on that airline. See 2002 NPRM, supra
note 5, at 69,397-98.
142 Id. at 69,398.
143 FTC COMMENTS, supra note 47, at 1-2.
144 The claim is not that markets will eliminate all bias. Rather, it is that CRS-instituted bias
will not likely be great enough to warrant special regulations to prevent it. Consumers buy products
from Intemet-based retailers who choose how to display their information without special regulatory
guidance. This includes travel agents selling hotel reservations and other non-airline bookings that are
not the subject of CRS regulation. Some displays may be biased to favor particular hotel chains, just as
grocery shelf-space displays may favor certain food manufacturers. The harm from this bias, if any,
has not proven great enough to warrant special regulations for Interet-based retailers, nor does it
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issue special anti-bias rules to constrain travel agents, and continued
command-and-control regulation of CRS displays and functionality would
thus make little sense.
All of this recognizes the potential for markets and consumer
protection laws to work hand in hand. Markets give retailers incentives to
offer good products and make them easy to find. Consumer-protection
rules that deter fraud reinforce this market incentive by allowing
consumers to be more confident about the information each seller provides
about quality. 145
There are, of course, other methods by which regulators could attempt
to address market failures associated with perceived asymmetries between
the quality of information that consumers receive and the quality of
information that suppliers might ideally provide. The wide array of
regulatory interventions in other industries illustrates some of the available
options. 146 The evidence from research on the effects of these
interventions has been mixed, however. 147 There are several possible
reasons for such regulations to fail to achieve their objectives of improving
the quality of consumer information: (i) the market has already addressed
the problem; 148 (ii) the regulation is poorly designed; and (iii) the
regulation is not adequately enforced. Any future concerns about CRS
display bias may thus give rise to numerous proposals for new rules,
including traditional disclosure regulations through which consumers
would be informed of the presence of any bias that might exist.
It is possible that some or all CRSs will choose to introduce, or "sell,"
display bias after the CRS regulations are terminated. Now that airlines
have divested their CRS ownership, the decision will depend solely on
how it affects the CRS vendor's profits, rather than on how it affects the
appear great enough to warrant ongoing regulation in the context of airline CRS displays.
145 Consistent with this, the enforcement efforts of the FTC pertaining to consumer
protection tend to target misleading and fraudulent conduct by sellers, such as fraudulent advertising.
While the seller of a bad product might go out of business eventually, the FTC's enforcement efforts
can speed up this process.
146 Examples of these disclosure issues abound in securities, food labeling, and lemon laws
by states.
147 See Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1944 Securities Act on Investor Information and the
Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 295 (1989) (presenting evidence that disclosure
regulation under the 1933 Securities Act improved market efficiency). But see Howard Beales et al.,
The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 491 (1981) ("[T]here has
been increased interest in techniques which ensure that consumers have sufficient information to
protect themselves against unsafe products or unfair seller behavior.... Despite the general acceptance
of this goal, analysis of how to efficiently provide consumer information has lagged behind.").
148 The idea is that information is a margin on which firms can compete, and thus,
competition will often generate full disclosure. This is not because every firm fully discloses, but
because rivals will exercise negative disclosure, i.e., disclose information unfavorable to others.
Nonetheless, competition does not always drive the market to full disclosure; indeed, it is often an
empirical question.
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joint profits of the CRS and its owner airline. 149 In particular, whatever
gains a CRS might accrue from introducing a bias must exceed the cost of
its potential loss of travel agents who may prefer to use an unbiased CRS.
Post-divestiture, it may make sense to reconsider the previously-dismissed
claims that display bias, as defined by the DOT, need not be harmful and
may even be beneficial in some instances.
In their 1992 article, Don Boudreaux and Jerome Ellig confront the
real possibility that unregulated CRS vendors might choose to sell display
space, much as other retailers often sell shelf and other display space to
upstream suppliers. 50 In doing so, they review the various incentives that
CRS vendors would face in choosing how to "bias" their displays in the
context of such a market. They point out that, even if we assume that travel
agents would not find it worthwhile to scroll down the screen and search
for more suitable flights for their consumers, a hypothetical travel agent
would take consumer interests into account when selecting its CRS vendor.
If the travel agent's customers tended to prefer a certain airline, for
example, the travel agent might be willing to pay a premium for the
services of a CRS that biases its displays so that the preferred airlines'
flights appear first, thereby saving the travel agent and its consumers time
that might otherwise be spent scrolling down a screen to find that preferred
airline. If being listed on the top of the screen actually confers an
advantage to the airline, then so long as airlines could bargain for the top
listing position, the CRS vendor may be able to charge premium for these
advantageous slots.' 5 '
The intuition behind this argument in its simplest form follows the
Coase Theorem in recognizing the potential for display space to go to its
highest-valuing use, so that in our example the airline that consumers most
prefer, taking quality and fares into account, is the one that the profit-
maximizing CRS vendor ultimately chooses to place at the top of the
display. 152 This could, but need not, confer an advantage on an established
airline over new entrants; as Boudreaux and Ellig point out, the sale of
display space could facilitate entry by allowing a new entrant to "buy in"
149 See Salop & Woodbury, supra note 121, for a formal analysis of the effect of divestiture
on the incentive of a CRS vendor to introduce bias into its display. Consumer reaction to any
disclosure of the sale of bias is one of the factors that appear likely to affect the CRS vendor's profits
from such sales.
150 See Boudreaux & Ellig, supra note 97, at 576-80.
151 See also MERCATUS CENTER, PUBLIC INTEREST COMMENT ON COMPUTER
RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS 10 (Mar. 17, 2003), available
athttp://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf85/237351_web.pdf ("Although some airlines might be 'harmed'
in this process, it is nevertheless effective in terms of allocating display positions to the highest-valued
uses.").
152 Settings in which the Coase Theorem applies are characterized by low transactions costs,
so that efficient bargaining can occur.
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to a particular market for passenger air travel.'5 3
Finally, even if bias in this context were harmful, estimates of the
costs of bias by an independently owned CRS vendor who is not seeking
to exclude any airline from the market suggest that those costs are much
lower than proponents of display bias regulation once thought. Morrison
and Winston in 1995 updated their 1986 study by presenting a model for
estimating the social cost of allowing CRS display bias, and report that
while "the effects of widespread CRS bias could become a major policy
concern,... the assumption is probably an inaccurate characterization of
the actual effects . ... " 54 They observed that, "even if bias is present,
travelers do not buy their tickets without asking questions.... [And] they
generally choose carriers on which they have frequent flier mileage."'
55
The idea is that travelers are usually not just passive consumers but
informed and repeat players who have their own preferences.
56
To summarize, the social value of prohibiting display and
functionality bias solely to improve the quality of information that
consumers receive about travel options appears to be low and may be
negative. Travel agents have strong incentives to protect consumers from
poor information, through how they customize their internal display
screens, and in their choices of CRS vendors. In this regard, there are no
significant differences between the CRS channel and other electronic
channels through which consumers receive information about their retail
options.
IV. Antitrust as a Strategic Alternative to Regulation
Having reviewed the changes in market conditions that have led to the
termination of CRS rules and the merits of termination relative to the
alternative of no government intervention, we now consider what level of
government intervention is actually likely to occur in the absence of CRS
regulation. We illustrate the correct benchmark for conducting a cost-
benefit analysis in regulatory reform and discuss related issues concerning
the relative merits of regulation versus antitrust intervention in the CRS
153 The latest regulatory assessment by the DOT recognizes the possibility of a market in
display bias after the regulations are terminated and expresses concern about the possible
consequences. See 2004 Regulatory Assessment, supra note 1, at 20 ("Biasing displays could still be
valuable to carriers, and absent some prohibition, the evidence indicates that the systems may be able
to sell it.").
154 MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 12, at 65 (1995). In estimating a "worst-case
scenario," they showed that most of the deadweight loss came not from "reduced service (the increases
in travel time and decreases in flight frequency were negligible)" as one might have expected but,
instead, from "the deletion of carriers with greater brand loyalty and brand preference-the smaller
carriers that do not own computer reservations systems." Id. at 64-65.
155 Id. at 63.
156 In 1993, 44% of all air trips were done by 8% of air travelers. See id. at 66.
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industry.
A. Identifying the Relevant Alternative: Reform with Non-Static
Institutions
A common mistake in evaluating the net benefits of a regulation to
society is to assume that a state of laissez-faire would arise in the absence
of regulation. The naive view that "no government" is the alternative to
regulation can lead to significant overstatement of the downside risks
associated with rule termination, especially if market mechanisms for
addressing those downside risks are not adequately taken into account.
This insight is relevant to our analysis of CRS regulation and appears to
have been overlooked in practice.'" Even as early as 1960, Ronald Coase
pointed out the inherent danger and flaw in this assumption and stressed
the importance of identifying the most probable state of the post-regulation
world:
[T]he usual treatment [involved in discussing harmful effects and welfare
economics] proceeds in terms of a comparison between a state of laissez
faire and some kind of ideal world. This approach inevitably leads to a
looseness of thought since the nature of the alternatives being compared
is never clear .... A better approach would seem to be to start our
analysis with a situation approximating that which actually exists, to
examine the effects of a proposed policy change, and to attempt to decide
whether the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than the
original one. In this way, conclusions for policy would have some
relevance to the actual situation.
158
Our review of the history of CRS regulation suggests that the relevant
alternative to regulation is heightened antitrust monitoring and
enforcement in this instance.
While this observation reflects an older theme in the general literature,
the previous literature has not highlighted the strategic nature of the
157 See, e.g., 2004 Regulatory Assessment, supra note 1, at 12 ("A cost-benefit analysis
generally involves a comparison of two projections into the future-expected market performance with
regulation and expected market performance without regulation."). While the DOT recognizes the
DOJ's "intent to take action" against CRS antitrust violations, the 2004 Final Rule sets a standard for
regulatory intervention that ignores this antitrust alternative. See 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 9991
(noting the DOJ's stated "intent to take action" against CRS antitrust violations); id. at 986 (noting the
DOT's view that, "[iun judging whether any regulation is necessary, the fundamental question is
whether market forces would discipline system practices"); cf. DOJ COMMENTS, supra note 10, at 18-
19. The comment on CRS regulation filed by Steven C. Salop and John R. Woodbury also expressly
recognizes antitrust enforcement as an alternative to regulation (in proposing antitrust guidelines for
CRS vendors to follow post-reform), although no prior commentary to our knowledge articulates the
strategic nature of the federal government's antitrust alternative to regulation, as proposed here. See
Salop & Woodbury, supra note 121, at 9.
158 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 43 (1960), reprinted in
THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra note 90, at 154 (emphasis added).
Vol. 21:369, 2004
Economics of Regulatory Reform
substitution. To illustrate, we can formally regard the government's role as
maximizing some aggregate measure of social welfare that is increasing in
the intensities of effort devoted to regulation, x, and to antitrust
enforcement, y, so that W = W(x, y).159 Recognizing that it is more difficult
to change the level of regulation than the level of antitrust intervention in
the short run, it is natural to consider the government as making the two
choices sequentially, choosing regulation x first, and then choosing
antitrust y = y*(x) optimally, given x. The amount of regulation
promulgated by a welfare-maximizing regulatory agency will then
determine the extent of antitrust enforcement by the DOJ or the FTC as
opposed to the other way around. 160 Just as antitrust enforcement choices
optimally depend on a market's regulatory status, the choice of regulation
optimally takes into account the likely strategic response of the antitrust
authorities to that choice of regulation.
Applying this to our analysis of CRS reform, the government may be
said to have initially chosen a bundle (xo, 0) of combined regulatory
intervention xo > 0 and zero-level of antitrust enforcement, with yo=0 ,
when it chose to promulgate CRS regulations and to not take antitrust
enforcement action in the industry. 161 Assuming that this choice
maximized social welfare at the time, it is clear that the social value of (xo,
0) must have then exceeded the social value of the laissez-faire alternative,
(0, 0). The harms that those regulations were designed to correct have
lessened due to changes in market conditions, as we have explained,
diminishing the value of the initial choice. This corresponds to a lessening
over time in the social value of the bundle (xo, 0) relative to the laissez-
faire benchmark.
The social value of maintaining CRS regulations at (xo, 0) may fall
below the social value of the laissez-faire altemative in this instance
because continued regulation may have adverse unintended consequences.
This recognizes that command-and-control regulation, while prohibiting
anticompetitive behavior, can hinder innovation in ways that are
159 The seemingly innocuous assumption that government would choose x and y to maximize
social value is precisely the notion refuted by the theories put forth in Part VI. But this assumption can
actually be relaxed: We only need to assume that even if the level of regulation may be determined by
forces other than general interest of society, the level of antitrust subsequently chosen will be
determined to maximize the net incremental benefit of antitrust enforcement. This assumption is
explained in detail in Part V as we discuss both (i) how government will have incentives to respond
with stepped-up antitrust enforcement if misconduct, however unlikely, were to occur, and (ii) how
antitrust officials have incentives to maximize the incremental social value. Thus, for a given level of
regulation, x, the government is presumed to choosey =y*(x) to maximize social welfare.
160 The sequential nature of choices by regulators and antitrust authorities is illustrated in the
discussion of the CRS jurisdictional muddle. See supra Section I.C. For other distinctions between the
choices of regulators and antitrust authorities, see infra Part V.
161 The fact that the optimal response to a particular level of regulation was zero antitrust
enforcement does not, by itself, show that the given level of regulation is optimal. The amount of
regulation might still be in surplus.
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unforeseen. 62 We have shown in Part III that the market conditions have
changed in ways that prevent the CRS regulations from continuing to
achieve their initial objectives. We also examined the net benefit of
continued regulation from a consumer protection perspective. In the
remaining Sections, we will consider the net benefit of CRS rules as a
mechanism for promoting antitrust enforcement. In doing so, we will
examine the potential usefulness of regulation as an alternative to antitrust
enforcement. This can be illustrated under the natural assumption that the
marginal social value of regulation, or of antitrust enforcement, is
decreasing in the initial level of either form of intervention. Accordingly,
for fixed x0, 163 the marginal social value of CRS regulation is decreasing
in the levels of antitrust and regulation.
Assuming that antitrust and regulation are substitute means of market
intervention, the optimal level of antitrust intervention increases as the
level of regulation decreases in this setting. As "a general principle, the
less the regulatory regime interferes with the workings of the market, the
more room for antitrust." 164 What this implies is that the government's best
choice can be to terminate the CRS rules even if their value has not been
fully depleted-in the sense of falling below the value of the laissez-faire
alternative.
Social welfare can be maximized by terminating regulations even if
the value of (xO, 0) exceeds the value of (0, 0) because deregulation would
be followed by antitrust enforcement in that instance. This is because the
government recognizes that a stage-one decision to terminate the
regulations would be followed by a stage-two adjustment to the level of
antitrust intervention. The level of antitrust intervention that maximizes
social welfare under the assumption of no regulation is y*(O), which
weakly exceeds y(xo) due to the substitutability of antitrust for regulation.
This includes the possibility that y*(O) = y(xo) = 0, as would arise if the
discipline of the market were strong enough to eliminate any potential for
harm that either regulation or antitrust might address. For the likely
hypothetical case in which y*(O) exceeds zero, however, it is clear that
terminating the regulation would cause an increase in the level of antitrust
intervention. In that instance, the government in choosing whether to
162 It is difficult to predict the kinds of innovations that a certain regulation is suppressing.
There may be solutions that policymakers could not imagine but would nonetheless come up when
industry participants actually face the situation. A classic example is the hub-and-spoke network
system of airlines: Although many scholars had surmised that the overall efficiency of the industry
would increase with the airline deregulation, almost nobody predicted the hub-and-spoke networks.
See Alfred E. Kahn, Airline Deregulation: A Mixed Bag, but a Clear Success Nevertheless, 16 TRANsP.
L.J. 229, 246-47 (1988).
163 To be sure, the level of CRS regulation has not stayed the same. Multiple revisions have
been made. It is nevertheless true that rules were rarely terminated; thus, initial rules have tended to
remain.
164 HovENKAMP, supra note 57, at 699.
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terminate the regulation in stage one would face a choice between
continued regulation (xo, 0) and antitrust intervention (0, y*(O)). Since
y*(O) is optimally chosen for zero-level of regulation, the social value
achieved by terminating the regulation (0, y*(O)) is necessarily greater than
if the antitrust authority did not respond by adjusting its enforcement
strategy. Ignoring this strategic substitution between regulation and
antitrust enforcement will thus introduce an upward bias into the estimated
benefit of continued regulation in the traditional cost-benefit analysis. 165
To summarize, correct identification of the relevant alternative to
regulation as being "other government action" allows us to identify a bias
toward overestimation of the benefits of continued regulation. This bias
arises in cases where regulation is superior to the laissez-faire alternative
yet inferior to the government's likely strategic response to deregulation.
In those cases, even if regulation is shown to confer a positive net benefit
relative to a hypothetical laissez-faire alternative, regulation may
nevertheless be found to reduce social welfare below what is achieved
under the next-best alternative in which the existence of strategic
substitutes for regulation, previously established by government, has been
taken into account. This point is important for industry observers who
might be concerned about the downside risk of rule termination and who
might erroneously regard regulation as the government's only means of
preventing, or deterring, the occurrence of adverse market outcomes that
antitrust enforcement would adequately address.
B. Regulation Is No Longer Justified as a Means of Antitrust
Enforcement
It is difficult to document the extent to which the bias identified in the
previous Section has caused the federal government to substitute
command-and-control regulation for antitrust and other forms of case-by-
case enforcement. In the case of CRSs, there is little discussion of antitrust
enforcement as an alternative to regulation in the documents filed by the
DOT and commenters on the CRS docket. The federal government's
choice of CRS rules and the claims that those rules benefit the public by
preventing antitrust misconduct also suggest that antitrust enforcement
tended not to be seen as an alternative to CRS regulation. Indeed, the DOT
cited the opinions of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ in explaining the
merits of its December 2003 announcement of a plan to delay termination
165 For more detail on strategic substitutes and complements, see supra Section I.B. See also
Jeremy Bulow et al., Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 93 J. POL. ECON.
488 (1985). Breyer also notes that "antitrust itself is not a direct substitute for regulation.... [But the]
function of antitrust is to make that unregulated market a competitive one." BREYER, supra note 9, at
161 (emphasis added).
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of certain regulations.' 66
A good example of a prohibition that would likely be more efficiently
enforced through antitrust enforcement action is the parity clause
prohibition that the DOT first articulated in 1997. The DOT announced
that it would delay termination of the prohibition against parity agreements
in December 2003, when it also announced the termination of most CRS
regulations. At the same time, the DOT added a new prohibition against
CRS vendors' insistence on an airline's best fares as a condition for the
airlines' participation in the system. The new rule was identified by the
DOT as being only temporary and slated for termination, along with the
parity rule, after a six-month transition period, in July 2004. Unlike CRS
regulations that purport to ease entry or deny airlines influence over CRS
vendors, neither rule appears to serve the initial goals of the CRS
regulation. The DOT does not appear to regard them as encouraging entry
by new CRS suppliers, nor does it appear to limit airline influence over
CRS vendors.
The potential for harm from the inclusion of parity clauses in CRS-
airline contracts is similar to the potential for harm from the most-favored
customer clauses that have been studied by economists 167 and by the
antitrust courts. By allowing an airline to buy another CRS vendor's
service only if it also buys the same service from the vendor with the
parity clause, the clause raises the total price that the airline must pay for
the other vendor's service. This can reduce the demand for the other
vendor's service. It can thereby diminish the incentive for other vendors to
offer new services and to innovate generally.
Yet parity clauses can also have beneficial effects. If innovation
requires continued purchase by the airline from the CRS vendor, a parity
clause can help to ensure that the vendor can recoup costs of specific
investments incurred in supplying high-quality CRS services to the airline.
For example, if improvements in the CRS vendor's services cause a
sustained and widespread increase in demand for travel on the airline, then
166 2004 Final Rule, supra note 1, at 985 ("The [Antitrust Division of the] Justice
Department recommends that we [the DOT] maintain only the rules prohibiting display bias and
possibly short-term rules barring certain types of most-favored-nation clauses in the systems' contracts
with participating airlines.").
167 DOJ COMMENTS, supra note 10, at 26 (citing both the benefits and harms that can result
from a prohibition of MFN clauses). On the merits of most-favored customer clauses, see David
Besanko & Thomas P. Lyon, Equilibrium Incentives for Most-Favored Customer Clauses in an
Oligopolistic Industry, 11 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 347, 347-67 (1993); Thomas E. Cooper, Most-
Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion, 17 RAND J. ECON. 377, 377-88 (1986); Patrick J.
DeGraba, The Effects of Price Restrictions on Competition Between National and Local Firms, 18
RAND J. ECON. 333, 333-47 (1987); and Charles A. Holt & David T. Scheffman, Facilitating
Practices: The Effects of Advance Notice and Best-Price Policies, 18 RAND J. ECON. 187, 187-97
(1987). A popular survey of a portion of this literature can be found in Steven C. Salop, Prices that
(Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination, in JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 265 (1986).
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in the absence of a parity clause, the airline might seek an alternative
channel for distributing tickets in order to avoid paying the CRS vendor's
booking fee. This would reduce the profit of the CRS vendor from the
improvement; the incentive to introduce the improvement in the first place
might then suffer. Airlines have indeed recently sought greater Internet
bookings, partly to reduce their payment of booking fees to CRS vendors.
It is thus unclear how the use of parity clauses--or any other MFN
provision in contracts between CRSs and airlines, such as the best fare
provision-affects the efficiency of CRS markets in principle. In such a
case, antitrust courts tend not to use bright-line, per se standards but rather
to take a rule of reason approach that involves extensive consideration of
the facts in each instance of the conduct. As in the case of most-favored
nation clauses generally, demonstration that parity clauses diminish the
efficiency of markets for CRS services would require clear evidence of
harm. But no clear evidence appears to have been put forward on the
public record to illuminate the adverse consequences of CRS vendors' use
of parity clauses. 168 An antitrust court would be well-suited to evaluate
any such evidence that may arise.
The benefits of CRS regulation as a tool for antitrust enforcement
69
appear even smaller when considered at the relevant margin, which is
relative to commitments that the federal government has established
elsewhere to enforce the antitrust laws.
C. The Institutional Commitment to Enforcement
The relevant alternative to any regulation from an economic
perspective depends on the institutional context and its implications for the
government's incentive and ability to intervene in the absence of the
regulation. In 1984, the antitrust enforcement authorities of the federal
government did not have full jurisdiction over the airline and related CRS
markets. Antitrust enforcement did not become a credible alternative to
regulation as a means for the federal government to prevent or deter
antitrust misconduct in those markets until statutory authority shifted from
the CAB and its successor, the DOT, to the DOJ.
One might be tempted to conclude that, after two decades of
168 In reviewing its experience in enforcing the antitrust laws relating to MFNs, the DOJ
highlights the absence of clear evidence of harm from MFNs between airlines and CRSs, going so far
as to explain how such clauses can be either harmful or beneficial, depending upon the facts. DOJ
COMMENTS, supra note 10, at 27.
169 Significant antitrust enforcement benefits arose from the initial application of CRS
regulations to prevent major airlines from adversely affecting competition in markets for passenger air
travel through their exercise of influence over CRSs. The CRS regulations contain several prohibitions
against conduct similar to what would violate the antitrust laws. Specifically, these include the rules
barring system-tying, the rules prohibiting MFN clauses, and the rules governing travel agents'
contracts.
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regulation, the federal government is ill-equipped to obtain relief in CRS
markets from the antitrust courts. Yet we find ample evidence of the
DOJ's propensity to intervene in the airline industry, including into efforts
by airlines that purport to avoid payment of booking fees to CRSs.
To illustrate, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ brought United States
v. AMR Corp. 170 after the DOT unsuccessfully sought regulations to
address complaints about predatory pricing in the airline industry. The
concern was that major airlines were using fare cuts as part of a strategy to
achieve, or maintain, hub domination.'71 After the DOT failed to enact
regulations addressing this concern, the DOJ filed a suit against one of the
targets of the complaints, American Airlines, alleging monopolization and
attempted monopolization through predatory pricing.
A second example is the DOJ's investigation of alleged antitrust
misconduct by Orbitz. 7 2 While Orbitz supplies some of the same services
as a CRS, it did not fall within the formal definition of a CRS because it
did not supply flight and ticket information to travel agents. While CRSs
and other complainants sought to have the DOT extend its CRS rules to
encompass Orbitz, the DOJ announced the opening of an investigation into
the competitive implications, and legality, of Orbitz' business practices,
including corporate governance practices that could facilitate collusion
among the airlines that belonged to Orbitz.
The DOJ has thus maintained the ability to intervene in airline and
CRS markets, even while the DOT has maintained relevant statutory
authority. A more general analysis of the efficiency of antitrust
enforcement would take into account the standing of states and private
parties to bring suit under the antitrust laws. In abstracting away from
these alternatives, our analysis conservatively understates the antitrust
discipline that CRS market participants likely would face in the courts,
post-rule termination.
In much the same way the airline industry was deregulated,
deregulation of the CRS industry would signify a de facto transfer of
authority from the DOT to the DOJ and would likely resolve the
170 United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
171 See, e.g., Dep't of Transp., Statement of Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair
Exclusionary Conduct (Apr. 6, 1998).
172 Orbitz was created by the five largest domestic airlines-Delta, United, Northwest,
Continental, and American-as a joint venture to compete against Interet travel distributors such as
Travelocity and Expedia, as well as other traditional ticket agents. The stated purpose of Orbitz was
initially to add an online option to existing distribution channels so the public could view of all
publicly available schedules and fare options at the same time. On the initial announcement and launch
of Orbitz, see Susan Carey and Martha Brannigan, Airlines To Offer Cheap Tickets on the Internet,
WALL ST. J., June 29, 2000, at BI; and Susan Carey, Orbitz Launch Faced Technical Problems as
Customers Swamped Travel Web Site, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2001, at Al5. For initial perspectives on its
competitive significance, see Con Hitchcock, Orbitz: Consumer Boon or Competition Buster? Service
Will Offer Better Information, More Choice, AIR & SPACE LAW., Spring 2001, at 1; John R. Mietus,
Jr., Recent Developments in Aviation, 28 TRANsP. L.J. 229 (2001).
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jurisdiction muddle described in Section I.C. This would, in effect, cause
the DOJ to keep a closer watch over the CRS industry so as to deter
abusive activities.
Moreover, unlike CRS regulation, which is industry-specific, the
federal government's commitment to monitor and enforce antitrust
compliance is quite general. Antitrust enforcement resources are limited,
yet the government can readily shift those resources across industries,
depending on the relative payoffs from enforcement in those industries.
For these reasons, current antitrust enforcement levels in an industry can
be poor predictors of future enforcement levels. This de facto transfer may
occur even without a change in the budget and without statutory
authorization because the Antitrust Division retains authority to reallocate
resources among cases without the approval of Congress.
Just as market imperfections can be corrected by a combination of
regulation and antitrust, the government can employ a combination of the
DOT and the DOJ to enhance the market conditions and to address
concerns about misconduct in CRS markets. Relaxing the use of one
agency will necessarily free up more opportunities for using the other, and
a federal government committed to market competition has every reason to
increase its reliance on the DOJ, to the extent concerns arise after the
termination of CRS rules. Thus, termination of CRS regulation would
likely trigger heightened antitrust scrutiny of the industry in the event of
antitrust complaints.
To be sure, a possible concern is that the courts might deny relief in
the event of misconduct in CRS markets. The failure of private efforts to
obtain antitrust remedies in the CRS industry in the past may mean that the
potential for harmful misconduct is low or, alternatively, that the courts are
unable to recognize the harm that occurs. Such conclusions would be
premature for two reasons. First, deregulation will remove any ambiguity
about the industry's implied antitrust immunity. As we saw in Section I.D,
the courts may have been more reluctant to intervene when regulation was
already pervasive in the industry. Second, this point relies on a static view
of the market, which is precisely the view we are trying to refute. The fact
that the DOJ has not initiated any antitrust action during the regulated
period only reveals that the CRSs, in complying with the DOT regulation,
have not engaged in any anticompetitive conduct. And if the CRSs do not
change their courses of dealings, then there does not need to be any
antitrust enforcement. Antitrust enforcement is the government's dynamic
response to deregulation because of the possibility that CRSs themselves
might respond dynamically to deregulation. The implication is that even
skeptics of free markets should reconsider before opposing deregulation in
this instance.
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D. Advantages of Antitrust Enforcement Over Regulation
If the government's expected response to deregulation is stepped-up
antitrust enforcement, it may seem as though there is no real merit to
deregulation since we are simply replacing one form of government
intervention with another. And to this extent, the word "deregulation" is a
misnomer: the correct characterization is whether the market "should be
'regulated by the agency' or 'regulated by the antitrust laws.'" 173
Nonetheless, antitrust enforcement has several salient aspects that make it
an improvement over traditional command-and-control regulation in
addressing the concerns about possible antitrust violations that have been
the focus of CRS regulation.
First, the probability is low that a new CRS remedy, or rule, will
actually be called for. In the case of CRS, the analysis pertains to a market
that has been regulated for twenty years. The relevant comparison is thus
not between antitrust and de novo regulation-as would have been the case
in 1984-but between antitrust and the maintenance of a regulatory
apparatus that does not seem to be improving the efficiency of the market
or otherwise achieving its expressed objectives. While the record in 1984
showed evidence of misconduct by CRS vendors, the contemporary record
in light of changes that have occurred over two decades is weak on
potential harm from allowing the market to function without regulation.
Even if the chance of a violation were high, however, antitrust
enforcement has several properties that make it more suitable than
regulation in this instance. First, there is little evidence that federal
antitrust officials are captured, in contrast with the evidence on the
interest-group capture of regulators. This may be due to the tendency of
antitrust officials to operate in a variety of different industries, so that the
value of their human capital is less dependent on their relations with any
specific industry, or to other differences between the incentives of antitrust
enforcement officials and regulators. Richard Posner has written:
[E]fforts to explain antitrust enforcement as just another example of
interest-group politics.., have not been successful, and the reasons may
be that the agencies are dominated by lawyers, most of whom go on to
jobs in the private sector, and that antitrust law itself is dominated by
federal judges exercising a broad discretion because of the open-
endedness of the major federal antitrust statutes. To land good berths in
the private practice of law the antitrust enforcers must demonstrate their
professionalism, which means keeping within the boundaries fixed by the
courts. Federal judges with their secure tenure are largely insulated from
173 HOVENKAMP, supra note 58, at 704.
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the interest-group pressures that play on the other branches of
government. 1
74
The legal rules that govern antitrust enforcement also make it less
prone to capture than regulation. Antitrust disputes are resolved under an
extensive civil case law that has evolved over more than a century to
facilitate the application of general antitrust principles to a variety of
market settings. Meanwhile, with administrative cases, the Chevron
deference given to regulatory agencies makes it difficult for the court to
intervene unless the regulation is clearly arbitrary and capricious. This
increases the discretion of the regulator relative to that of the antitrust
enforcement authority. While the government's enforcement authorities
may exercise discretion in choosing what cases to bring, the effect of this
discretion on enforcement outcomes is limited by the abilities of private
parties to bring their own separate enforcement actions under the federal
antitrust statutes.
It is realistic to expect careful scrutiny of CRS conduct by antitrust
enforcement officials and potential plaintiffs following the termination of
the CRS rules. If the observed conduct is found to cause the kind of injury
that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent, specific remedies can be
crafted to address that misconduct. While a delay between detection and
adjudication might appear to limit the significance of the remedy, the
antitrust laws provide for treble damages and other penalties that create
disincentives to engage in misconduct. Thus, the prospect of antitrust
enforcement promotes deterrence while providing an institutional context
in which industry-specific rules can be crafted in the form of court-
enforced settlements obtained in response to whatever violations might
occur post-deregulation.
V. Why Has Deregulation Occurred? The Modern Theories
Thus far, our analysis has focused on the net benefit of continuing
regulation; in this sense, the perspective has been distinctively normative.
We have made no attempt to explain why deregulation, or something close
to it, has actually come about. In this Part, we do precisely that: We try to
understand the recent move toward deregulation in light of modem
theories of regulation. According to modern theories, deregulation occurs
not when the costs of regulation exceed the benefits, but when
deregulation is compatible with the incentives of influential private parties,
including not only special interests but also individuals within
government. Deregulation may enhance social welfare, but it need not.
174 Posner, supra note 134, at 942.
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Drawing from the many positive models of regulatory reform set
forth in the modem literature, this Part will focus on three distinct
approaches. We refer to these different approaches as the "interest group,"
"institutional barrier," and "informational asymmetry" theories of
regulatory reform. They are not mutually exclusive, but each highlights the
importance of a different set of conditions to reform. Our goal is to survey
the practical implications of each approach in light of the evidence
surrounding CRS reform.
We conclude that the CRS rule termination appears to be a classic
case of deregulation under an "interest group" theory in which the gradual
dissipation of rents from regulation ultimately triggers reform. In this
instance, technological advance appears to have made entry profitable for
suppliers not subject to CRS regulation, which accelerated rent dissipation
and thus reform. Other modem theories of reform highlight evidence to
suggest that the institutional barriers to reform were low in the CRS
market; however, those theories do not appear to explain the timing of
CRS rule termination.
A. Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation
The interest group theory of regulation hypothesizes that "regulation
is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its
benefit."'175 Roughly speaking, individuals who have a greater interest in
regulation will organize into pressure groups in order to achieve the
benefits of regulation, and legislators and other politicians facilitate the
mechanism through the administrative process. Pressure groups so-
organized will have much greater bargaining power than the general,
diffuse public since the groups may deliver votes, campaign contributions,
or outright bribes. Consequently, the theory argues, public policy is simply
a result of a process driven by interest group control and influence. So long
as the interest group remains intact, the regulation should continue to
shield the group. The weakness of interest group theory in its simplest
form is that it purports to explain why regulations tend to remain; but this
obviously cannot be the complete story, since a number of deregulation
movements did occur in the 1970s and 1980s.
176
After observing the deregulation that occurred during the 1980s,
Peltzman provided a reassessment of this theory to account for the
175 Stigler, supra note 9, at 3.
176 These industries include railroads, trucking, airlines, long-distance telecommunications,
stock brokerage, banking, and oil, among others. For a detailed discussion of these industries, see Sam
Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation, in 1989 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 21-37 (1989).
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apparent tendencies toward deregulation."17 According to this modified
version, regulation is likely to occur where there is a wide discrepancy
under deregulation between the political balance of pressure and the
distribution of wealth. Eventually, regulation will bring about wealth
dissipation, possibly due to some exogenous force. At some point, with the
atrophy of payoffs from costly efforts to maintain regulatory rules,
restoration of the pre-regulation status quo will become more attractive
than continued regulation. Therefore, Peltzman argued, "[D]eregulation is
not the correction of some belatedly recognized policy error . . . [but
rather] the last stage of the process.,, 178 As long as surplus wealth remains
to be distributed as political payoffs, regulation will remain and will be
preferred and supported by interested groups over the pre-regulation status
quo. 
17 9
The practical implication is that observable changes in the regulatory
environment tend to precede deregulation. Peltzman highlights two such
changes. First, the cost of maintaining a sufficient coalition of interested
parties to support the regulation may increase. Second, changes in the
industry's costs and demand may reduce the amount of rent that is
extracted, causing it to fall below the costs of maintaining the regulation.
Evidence that such changes preceded the announcement of a plan to
terminate the CRS rules would support the view that a modified interest
group theory explains regulatory reform in this instance.
Indeed, the conditions leading up to the announced termination of the
CRS rules are consistent with this interest group theory of deregulation.
For example, evolution of CRS vendor support for CRS regulation
suggests that CRS vendors were among the significant beneficiaries of
CRS regulation.180 Throughout the 1990s, CRS vendors-including Sabre,
the largest of them-tended to support the DOT's continued regulation of
CRS markets, including the addition of new CRS rules in 1997. According
to airline complaints, CRS regulations gave the vendors extra bargaining
power in setting the booking fees that airlines paid them. Under the
mandatory participation rule, the threat of switching among CRS vendors
was of limited use to airlines in bargaining with CRS vendors over
booking fees. Under the modified interest group theory, this would explain
the CRS vendors' support for the regulation. Other wealth implications of
the CRS regulation, not reviewed here, also may account for the sustained
177 See id.
178 Id. at 38.
179 In addition, we may have changes in technology that trigger regulatory reforms. See 2003
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 159 (2003) ("With time, regulations are more likely to
become . . . irrelevant, because of changes in technology or in the products . . . available in the
marketplace. Such changes are often a prerequisite for successful regulatory reform, because they
weaken resistance to reform from those interest groups that benefit from the status quo.").
180 See supra Section I.E.
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support by CRS vendors for continued regulation
1 '
Dramatic changes eventually occurred in CRS cost and demand,
however. Advances in electronic and Internet technologies during the
1990s affected the distribution of airline tickets. As the new technology
made CRS vendors more efficient, it opened up new channels for
electronic commerce generally. Airlines and travelers found alternative
channels for the electronic distribution of tickets during this time. CRS
vendors accordingly faced real and potential losses in the volume of their
airline ticket bookings and related profits. In terms of the modified interest
group theory, CRSs' gains from continued regulation appear to have
declined. CRS vendors initially responded to these events by supporting
the application of CRS regulations to the new direct-to-traveler distributors,
rather than just to distributors who provided electronic distribution solely
to travel agents. Sabre, Worldspan, and Amadeus expressly urged the DOT
to extend its CRS regulations so that they applied to Orbitz and other
innovative service suppliers, and not only to the incumbents.1
8 2
Only after the DOT declined to extend the CRS regulations to the
new Internet-based vendors did any CRS vendor change its position
publicly to advocate terminating, rather than extending, the CRS
regulations. This strongly supports the view that the dissipation of rents
from regulation under a modified interest group theory explains the
occurrence-and timing-of CRS rule termination. Related costs to
incumbents appear to have included costs of supplying services that would
not be provided but for the regulation and subtler costs from having to
adapt their business models and competition strategies to meet regulatory
constraints, which may have included the lost benefits of innovation.
181 Airlines and travel agents might also pose as interest groups in the modem model of
reform. Their larger size and greater heterogeneity of membership make such groups potentially more
complex, however. The CRS regulations were designed to treat airlines that owned CRSs differently
from other airlines, for example. Airlines' views of CRS regulation may also vary with their
competition strategies, such as whether the airline is a traditional network carrier or a regional discount
carrier. Airlines indeed expressed different views of CRS regulation during 2003. United Airline was
arguing for complete deregulation. See UNITED AIR LINES, INC., COMMENTS OF UNITED AIR LINES,
INC. (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf85/237376_web.pdf. Continental,
Delta, and Northwest were supporting deregulation with a transition period. See CONTINENTAL
AIRLINES, INC., COMMENTS OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC. (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf85/237395_.web.pdf, DELTA AIR LINES, INC., COMMENTS OF
DELTA AIR LINES, (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf85/237333_web.pdf; NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., COMMENTS OF
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf85/237373_web.pdf. By contrast, American Airline and
USAirways urged the DOT to continue CRS regulation. See AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., COMMENTS OF
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf85/237415_web.pdf; USAIRWAYS, INC., COMMENTS OF
USAIRWAYS, INC. (Mar. 17, 2003), available at
http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf85/237405_web.pdf.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
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As the value of the regulation fell for these vendors, the cost of
maintaining a sufficient coalition to support continued regulation appears
to have risen. Specifically, while it is unclear why Galileo would support
continued regulation, a modified interest group theory would suggest that
when the other three switched their position on CRS regulation, the "well-
organized interest groups" became less homogenous, which would raise
the cost of maintaining a sufficient coalition of interested parties to support
the regulation. This is a predictor of deregulation under the modified
interest group theory of CRS rule termination.
In sum, the observed episode of CRS deregulation offers a classic
illustration of the occurrence of deregulation as the outcome of a process
of regulatory obsolescence following advances in technology and entry
under the modified interest group theory.
B. Institutional Barriers: Structure-Induced Equilibrium Theory and
Beyond
Other modem theories of regulatory reform have subtler predictions
on the conditions that trigger reform, focusing on the institutions of
government itself. Like the theory of economic change as a trigger for
reform, the theory of structure-induced equilibrium emerged from attempts
to understand why changes in government regulation occur less frequently
than predicted under earlier theories of reform.
The institutional theory of regulatory reform dates back to the 1970s.
The theory of structure-induced equilibrium--then pioneered by Kenneth
A. Shepsle--emerged as a response to a quandary posed by existing
models that had then predicted the existence of volatile government
institutions rather than the stable institutions we observe.'8 3 This theory
posits that "participants in the political process, recognizing its propensity
for chaotic behavior and being risk averse (and hence valuing stability in
its own right), [tend to] construct constraints on policy change that
increase the difficulty and cost of upsetting the status quo.''84
The long administrative process necessary for regulatory reform to
occur is a case in point. The notice-and-comment procedures established
183 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in
Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 27 (1970). Recent criticism of Shepsle's
approach argues that the institutional set-up inducing equilibrium still needs to be designed by some
authorities, and that designing a political institution is, in and of itself, a political outcome. Structure-
induced equilibrium theory does not explain how these institutions arise. For a critique and an attempt
to salvage structure-induced equilibrium, see THRArNN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND
INSTITUTIONS 69-73 (1990).
184 Roger Noll, Comment on The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of
Deregulation, in 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 50 (1989)
(reviewing Peltzman, supra note 177).
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by the Administrative Procedure Act for informal rulemakings,' 85 while
necessary "to ensure that these regulations [are] in society's best
interests,"'186 inevitably delay implementation of new policies. Even apart
from the arduous process, the inherent set up of the regulatory process is
often such that regulators generally tend to favor the status quo over new
experiments. 187 While the delays that appear to be induced by the APA
may account for lags in CRS rule termination, the practical relevance of
the Act becomes clearer from the perspective of the informational theories
to be reviewed in Section V.C.
The theory of regulation as a structure-induced equilibrium suggests
that institutional barriers to reform can prevent the termination of non-
meritorious rules that have lost the support of interest groups. Roger Noll
has, however, identified the conditions under which those barriers could be
overcome. 188 First, deregulation is more likely to occur if it does not
require changes in legislation. Second, actions by the courts or by other
government agencies can trigger deregulation by confronting Congress (or
the incumbent regulator) with a new status quo. Third, the arrival of a
political entrepreneur can undermine structure-induced stability and thus
trigger deregulation. A political entrepreneur in this context is a person
who "discovers how to take advantage of the fundamental instability of
majority rule within the constraints imposed by the institutional
arrangements designed to induce stability." Noll, for example, attributes
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 to the entrepreneurship of Alfred E.
Kahn at the CAB.
Generally speaking, institutional obstacles to CRS rule termination
appear to have been low. There is no evidence of statutory or court
obstacles to CRS rule termination. No legislation was required for the
termination of CRS regulations; instead, the DOT continued to specify
sunset dates. The DOT could have terminated the CRS regulations at any
time since their inception without the express consent of Congress. Unlike
the airline deregulation in the 1970s, we have found little evidence of any
"political entrepreneur" as a trigger to CRS rule termination.
Nonetheless, Noll's concept of political entrepreneurship may still
apply here. Such a person could arrive eventually, since over time there is
substantial turnover of personnel involved in any organization. In other
185 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-560 (2001). For a detailed account of the
chronology of new rule-making regulations, see VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 117, at 18-22.
186 VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 117, at 23.
187 For example, allocating public resources through a renewal process tends to favor the
status quo, thereby protecting existing finns at the expense of new ones. See BREYER, supra note 9, at
89-90.
188 These hypothesized predictors of reform under the theory of regulation as a structure-
induced equilibrium follow Noll's discussion of the conditions under which barriers to reform appear
to have been overcome in the past under that theory. See Noll, supra note 185, at 50-51.
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words, one would expect the chances of a real reform to increase with the
amount of turnover and, accordingly, with the passage of time. More
specifically, recall that the first CRS regulations were put into place very
soon after the termination of comprehensive economic regulation of the
airline industry, including the setting of ticket prices and attempts to
regulate quality of service. Significant expertise thus resided within the
federal government on the regulation of airlines and related ticket
distribution. Such expertise would surely obsolesce over time, however, in
the sense that personnel turnover can reduce the regulatory institution's
specific investment of human capital in the regulation, so that the
institution's cost of maintaining the regulation rises, and the cost of reform
falls. Since the CRS rules have existed for twenty years, we would expect
a change of personnel involved in drafting or enforcing these rules, and, in
theory, this may have facilitated elimination of some of the rules.
That said, the institutional theory does not significantly contribute to
our understanding of the timing of reform. While the DOJ gained authority
to intervene in CRS markets during the period of the regulation, the
expansion of the DOJ's authority occurred too early to provide a
meaningful explanation for the decision to deregulate CRS markets.
Moreover, the DOT expanded the scope of the CRS regulations several
times after the DOJ gained authority. We have found no significant
changes in regulatory institutions that would suggest a lowering of
regulatory barriers to reform in the period immediately preceding the
DOT's announcement of plans to terminate the regulations.
C. Informational Asymmetry and Slack
Information-based theories of regulatory reform highlight the role of
information and its allocation in shaping both institutions and the choices
of individuals in both government and the private sector. This approach
builds on the natural assumptions that the public has less information than
industry participants or regulators about the regulations and their
consequences and, accordingly, that those "in the know" can exploit this
informational asymmetry to their advantage. The literature highlights
several ways in which government officials can shift the regulatory
equilibrium by affecting the information that outsiders receive about
regulations. These include spreading free information, obfuscating
information, or taking advantage of institutionally opaque information. Of
these, the institutional slack model--developed by Michael E. Levine and
Jennifer Forrence-seems to provide a useful insight into CRS
deregulation.'8 9 In the next section, we also return to the model of optimal
189 Michael E. Levine and Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest and the
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obfuscation to consider a plausible explanation for the choice of the rules
that were slated to remain until July 31, 2004.
It is difficult to determine what informational asymmetries may have
existed around the period of CRS rule termination. Nevertheless, we can
identify institutions that appear to have reduced the cost of obtaining
information about CRS reform to affected parties. Our review of the record
additionally suggests that some of the rules had more transparent
implications for the public interest than others. That said, the potential for
informational asymmetry to affect the outcomes of CRS regulation appears
to be large because CRS markets and their regulation never moved onto
the public agenda over the twenty years of regulation of that industry.
The lack of public awareness of CRS regulations and markets seems
to reflect the obscurity and complexity of CRS markets, rather than any
express attempt to obscure public perception of those markets. Under the
information-based theories of reform, a lack of public awareness is
generally associated with the increased exercise of discretion by regulators
and, relatedly, less attention to the general interest (accordingly, more
"slack" or "shirking"). This would, in turn, suggest relatively high barriers
to rule termination.
Other institutional conditions were present, however, that have
countervailing, slack-reducing effects. First of all, the requirement of
periodic review of the social value of the regulation intensified the
monitoring that CRS regulators received within the executive branch and
brought their actions more closely into alignment with the general interest,
particularly after the lessening of interest group support for the regulation.
Second, we can consider the possibility of "political competition" between
enforcement institutions, here the DOT versus the DOJ. Admittedly, this is
not the purest example of political competition since the agencies are both
part of the executive branch. Be that as it may, the DOT had even more
slack prior to 1989 since (i) it was a monopolist in the government's
supply of antitrust discipline in the airline and related CRS markets, and
(ii) the rules were sufficiently complex to shield the effectual outcomes.
Any institutional barriers arising from the DOT's exercise of discretion as
sole enforcement authority diminished significantly when an additional
antitrust enforcement authority came on board.
The theory posits that if slack is reduced concerning certain
regulatory issues, outcomes on those issues will tend more frequently to
serve the general interest. The general idea behind the institutional slack
model is that regulatory outcomes depend on what regulators choose to do
with the informational asymmetry that they face. 190 For instance, a
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990).
190 Id. at 167-98.
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regulator who prefers to pursue a policy that the general public would
oppose can do so more easily if his actions are shielded from the general
public. Therefore, depending on how much slack a regulator has, both
interest groups and the general polity can affect the process of regulatory
reform.
Regardless of whether a regulator is captured or Burkean, 191
information costs are critical to the amount of slack. 192 If information
were costless, there would be no slack, and the regulator would choose to
act in the interest of the general public or face removal from office. There
would be neither capture nor indulgence in self-interested or Burkean
regulation. Levine and Forrence formulate their hypothesis as follows:
Whether a regulator will be captured or not is a function of whether slack
has been drastically reduced by moving an issue onto the public agenda
and, if not, whether or not the regulator with the relevant slack will
behave in a Burkean manner [which] depends on her demands for
Burkean behavior-the costs of which are the risk of exposure and the
loss of the opportunity to sell slack, and the benefits of which are the
strength of her other-regarding conviction and the utility she gets from
seeing them carried out ....t93
Consequently, the outcomes of regulatory issues that make it onto the
public agenda will more likely be characterized as in the general interest.
While it is difficult to determine what informational asymmetries may
have existed around the period of CRS rule termination, we do know that
CRS markets and their regulation never moved onto the public agenda
over the twenty years of regulation of that industry. To this day, the
general public knows very little about how CRSs operate. This lack of
public awareness is generally associated with the increased exercise of
discretion by regulators, less attention to the general interest, and more
slack, all of which would in turn suggest relatively high barriers to rule
termination.
If CRS regulation had lost its social value as early as 1989, this should
have led to its termination at that time, or shortly thereafter. The opposite
occurred, however, when the regulations were not terminated but instead
grew in scope during the 1990s. It is not clear whether this reflects the
191 Note that this literature recognizes two cases in which the regulator's policy interest
deviates from the general public's wish. One is the familiar notion of capture, where a regulator caters
to special interest groups so as to gather votes. The other is the case of a Burkean regulator-one who
is ideologically driven in the sense of wanting to do what he or she believes is good for society,
independently of society's expressed wishes.
192 Levine and Forrence identify several slack-reducing institutions. These include: (i)
incumbent self-publicity; (ii) political competition that creates more opportunities for monitoring; (iii)
single-issue, proactive organizations such as Public Citizen, or scholars who constitute the public
policy intelligentsia; and (iv) the news media, whose profits depend on attracting mass audiences. See
generally Levine & Forrence, supra note 190.
193 Id. at 193.
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merits of the regulations, uncertainty about their social value, or the
persistence of some other obstacle to deregulation. But the slack-reducing
institution in this case may not have been sufficient to generate immediate
scrutiny because the transition of authority did not exactly happen with a
bang. 194 By 2003, however, the looming presence of the DOJ had a clear
effect on the regulatory process and, possibly, on the outcome of that
process. The DOT's "final rule" from January, 2004 illustrates its reaction
to, deference to, and accommodation of suggestions by the DOJ on the
design of CRS regulations.
Finally, the notice-and-comment procedures for informal rulemakings
inevitably caused delays in implementation of new policies; as such, the
status quo was hard to overcome in a short period. With more reviews of
the rules, however, it was becoming clear that the market situations had
changed drastically in the preceding twenty years ago. In short, the APA,
while causing delays in the short run, can also serve to reduce slack as
periodic reviews require scrutiny under multiple parties. These set-ups
may explain both why the sunset dates have been delayed for so long and
why many of the rules were eventually eliminated.
D. Possible Explanation for a Remaining Lag in Rule Termination
While the primary challenge of the modem theories as they apply to
CRS reform is to explain the apparent alignment between the reform
decision and the public interest, it remains the case that the DOT has
delayed termination of two remaining regulations. Our analysis of the
merits uncovered no evidence that retaining these remaining CRS
regulations will create social value. 195 While the 1984 regulations were
triggered by complaints about CRS vendor and airline misconduct, market
194 See supra text accompanying note 43.
195 The DOT explained the 6-month "transition" period before termination of CRS rules
against display bias and against CRS vendor requirements that airlines pay for parity in services or
supply webfares as necessary to enable travel agents, airlines, and consumers to institute their own
precautions against such CRS vendor requirements, which the DOT found likely to occur. See 2004
Final Rule, supra note 1, at 977:
We are readopting the rules against display bias because we believe that, were the
rules terminated immediately, systems might well be expected to bias their
displays ....
Similarly, we are adopting for the same short transition period two rules
governing the contracts between the systems and airlines: rules prohibiting parity
clauses . . . and clauses requiring airlines to provide access to all webfares as a
condition to any participation in a system. However, an airline is free to agree to
such clauses. We believe that, were these prohibitions terminated immediately, the
systems would have sufficient market power to impose contract terms on airlines
that would unreasonably restrict the airlines' ability to bargain for better terms for
participation. The transition period during which these prohibitions will be
maintained will furnish the industry with reasonable notice of the forthcoming
change with an opportunity to prepare for it.
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conditions have changed since the rules' inception, and those changes
make the recurrence of such misconduct unlikely. The simplest story
behind the temporary retention of these rules may be that some
commenters prefer to keep the CRS rules as a form of insurance against
the possibility that the misconduct might nevertheless recur, as it might if
the market conditions that led to the misconduct were also to recur.
Alternatively, one could see the retention as the DOT's signal and warning,
indicating that the DOT continues to maintain authority to intervene if
anticompetitive conducts are observed in the future. After all, the DOT
may be able to re-regulate the industry. Nevertheless, the low probability
of the recurrence of misconduct, in combination with the efficiency
considerations favoring antitrust over regulation, leads us to believe that
other issues might also be at play.
A relevant framework in this instance might be the model of optimal
political obfuscation developed by Magee, Brock, and Young. 196
Obfuscation in this context refers to distorting the policy in a way that
makes it difficult for voters to determine the merits of the policy and,
especially, who benefits from the policy and who is harmed. Obfuscation,
however, is achieved in this context only at the expense of lost benefits to
constituents. A government official's rational choice is thus an optimally
obfuscated policy that reflects a trade-off between the cost of
obfuscation-which limits the value of the policy to constituents-and the
value of the obfuscation in limiting opposition to the policy by third
parties-which increases its probability of successful realization.
In this view, government officials exercise their discretion by
skillfully balancing social benefits and private political benefits of
regulation. Thus, they choose to terminate regulations that create the
greatest social harm-including regulations that most adversely affect
interested parties-while retaining those that are less obviously harmful
and politically popular. In our context, the complexity of CRS rules and
how they affect the market equilibrium plausibly indicate either
uncertainty about the effect of the rules (as when nobody has the
information) or asymmetric information (when only insiders have the
information).
Letting the DOT take the role of "party" in the above discussion, the
model would presumably rank-order different CRS rules according to (i)
their efficiency (from a cost-benefit analysis perspective) and (ii) their
complexity (as a proxy for obscurity). Among rules that are inefficient,
Magee, Brock, and Young would predict termination of rules with low
obscurity-such as the mandatory participation rule-and retention of
196 WILLIAM A. BROCK, STEPHEN P. MAGEE & LESLIE YOUNG, BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND
ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY 259-63 (1989).
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rules with high obscurity-such as, perhaps, the parity rule whose benefits
and harms are not widely understood. Obscurity is not an absolute litmus
test, however: The display bias rules remain despite its low obscurity. In
this instance, the model would conclude that this rule must be a politically
feasible one--one that garners a great deal of support from airlines that
might not otherwise benefit from CRS regulation.
Under a more general reform-barrier hypothesis, rules are terminated
only if the social value of termination exceeds the real cost of overcoming
institutional barriers to termination. Consistent with the reform-barrier
hypothesis, the evidence is that the rules chosen for immediate termination
cause greater social harm and more directly affect commenting parties than
do rules chosen for delayed termination. The rules to be terminated after
the six-month transition period appear less harmful than those chosen for
immediate termination, and their adverse effect does not as directly accrue
to any specific CRS market participant.
VI. Conclusion
Deregulation of the airline computer reservation system industry has
been overdue. Twenty years have passed since the Civil Aeronautics
Board first promulgated rules governing the market for CRS services.
With regard to the proponents' expressed goals, some may have been
achieved, while it is implausible to expect others to be attained by means
of continued regulation. In this Article, we have examined the merits of
CRS rules and the likely regulatory dynamics in the absence of these
regulations. We have approached these issues from the perspectives of
both the traditional theory of regulation in the public interest and modern
theories that highlight the institutional and rational-choice properties of
regulation and its reform.
Analysis of market conditions, in light of the social value of CRS
regulation, supports the conclusion that even proponents of initial CRS
regulation would find the current plan to terminate all CRS rules to be
desirable. Additional analysis of the dynamics of regulation reinforces this
conclusion on the merits, while revealing that the decision to deregulate
CRS markets can also be seen as a rational choice of government under
modern positive political theories of reform.
We have applied the modern theory in arguing that the government
maintains a strategic commitment to enforce the antitrust laws, and that
this limits the potential for harm post-termination. Traditional cost-benefit
studies that neglect the government's strategic alternatives can thus
produce biased results generally, and overstate the benefits of regulation
and the cost of termination in this instance.
An additional implication of the modern theory is that changes in the
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private value of the regulations to CRS industry participants may have
alone been enough to trigger reform. An "interest group" theory, rather
than an "institutional" or "information-based" theory of regulatory reform
appears best to account for the DOT's decision to lift its regulation of CRS
markets. Institutional barriers to CRS reform were low, yet had been low
for more than a decade prior to the DOT's announcement of its decision.
The deregulation of CRS markets, which are obscure, did not make it onto
the public agenda during this period. We have nevertheless identified some
features of the institutional setting that plausibly affected the flow of
information and the incentives within government to eliminate the CRS
rules.
That said, this Article has provided only a first look at the CRS rule
termination from the perspective of the modem theory. As time passes and
a record emerges on CRS market dynamics without DOT regulation, we
expect this case to yield additional insights into the practical relevance of
modem rational-choice theories of reform.

